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
U. S. Congress Jt.
Comm. on the
conduct of the war

Tribune War Tracts
no. 1



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THE TRIBUNE WAR TRACTS.

No. 1. /

U.S. Congress, Joint committee on the conduct of the war

REPORT

OF THE

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CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

CAUSES OF ITS INACTION AND ILL SUCCESS.

ITS SEVERAL CAMPAIGNS.

WHY MCLELLAN WAS REMOVED.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

REMOVAL OF BURNSIDE.

NEW YORK:

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REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

ON

THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR:

Mr. Wade, from the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, submitted the following report, with the accompanying testimony:

CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

In December, 1861, a joint committee of the two houses of Congress, consisting of three members of the Senate and four members of the House of Representatives, was appointed, with instructions to inquire into the conduct of the present war.

Your Committee proceeded to the discharge of the duty devolved upon them, and have labored zealously, and they trust, faithfully, for that purpose. In evidence of that, they would refer to the large mass of testimony taken by them, upon many subjects, and herewith reported.

The subject of inquiry referred to them was one of the utmost importance and magnitude. Upon "the conduct of the present war" depended the issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, after so much expenditure of blood and treasure—the establishment of a nation founded upon the capacity of man for self-government. The nation was engaged in a contest for its very existence; a rebellion, unparalleled in history, threatened the overthrow of our free institutions, and the most prompt and vigorous measures were demanded by every consideration of honor, patriotism, and a due regard for the prosperity and happiness of the people.

Your Committee could perceive no necessity for recommending any particular legislation to Congress. Its previous course showed that no such recommendation was required. When Congress met the preceding July, fresh from the people—called upon to provide for the safety of the Government and the maintenance of the national honor and existence—the representatives of the people gave full evidence that they comprehended the duty devolved upon them, and had the courage and will to fully discharge it. The administration called by the people to the head of the Government, in this most critical period of the nation's history, was more promptly and fully supported than that of any other Government of which history has preserved any record. The call of the President for money and men had been more than complied with; no legislation which he had deemed necessary had been denied by Congress, and the people had most nobly and generously supported and sustained what their representatives had promised in their name. The same Congress, fresh from their constituents, had again met, and there could be no doubt that, as they had before acted, so would they continue to act. It needs but to refer to the history of the Congress just closed, its prompt and thorough action; clothing the Executive with the fullest power, placing at his disposal all the resources of men and money which this nation possessed, to prove that your Committee judged rightly that Con-

gress needed no prompting from them to do its entire duty.

Not upon those whose duty it was to provide the means necessary to put down the Rebellion, but upon those whose duty it was to rightfully apply those means, and the agents they employed for that purpose, rested the blame, if any, that the hopes of the nation have not been realized, and its expectations have so long been disappointed.

Your Committee therefore concluded that they would best perform their duty by endeavoring to obtain such information in respect to the conduct of the war as would best enable them to advise what mistakes had been made in the past, and the proper course to be pursued in the future; to obtain such information as the many and laborious duties of the President, and his Cabinet prevented them from acquiring, and to lay it before them with such recommendations and suggestions as seemed to be most imperatively demanded; and the journal of the proceedings of your Committee shows that, for a long time, they were in constant communication with the President and his Cabinet, and neglected no opportunity of at once laying before them the information acquired by them in the course of their investigations.

Many specific subjects of investigation presented themselves for the consideration of your Committee, any one of which might well require the action of a committee for itself; and all of which, if fully investigated, would demand the attention of all the representatives in Congress. It was apparent from the first that your Committee would be compelled to confine their attention to a few of the more prominent subjects of inquiry; to those the investigation of which would best enable them to comprehend the causes and necessity, if any, for the delay and inaction characterizing the operations of our armies in the field.

And while each of those subjects has received from them the attention which its importance merited, so far as they were able to give it, the attention of your Committee has been turned more particularly to the history of the Army of the Potomac. In the history of that army it is to be found all that is necessary to enable your Committee to report upon "the conduct of the war." Had that army fulfilled all that a generous and confiding people were justified in expecting from it, this rebellion had long since been crushed, and the blessings of peace restored to this nation. The failure of that army to fulfill those expectations has prolonged the contest to the present time, with all its expenditure of life and treasure, for it has to a great extent neutralized, if not entirely destroyed, the legitimate fruits which would otherwise have been reaped from our glorious victories in the West.

Therefore, while your Committee have not failed to take the testimony of witnesses in relation to military operations in other parts of the country, and also upon various subjects to which their attention has been specially directed by Congress and the War Department since the Committee was first appointed, the principal part of the testimony taken

by them relates to the Army of the Potomac and those subjects more immediately connected with its operations. They have taken the testimony of nearly 200 witnesses, almost entirely men in the military service of the Government, including about 100 generals.

The disaster at Ball Run in July, 1861, was fully investigated by your Committee, us being the first conflict of the national troops with armed treason upon the field of battle; and also because the troops there engaged formed the nucleus around which has since been collected the vast and magnificent Army of the Potomac. The result of their investigation your Committee submit in a separate report.

Your Committee have also investigated the disaster at Ball's Bluff, that battle being the first conflict of any extent in which any of the troops of the army of the Potomac were engaged after its re-organization. A separate report of that disaster is also submitted.

Immediately upon the organization of your Committee, and before proceeding to the taking of any testimony, they addressed to Gen. McClellan, who, by the retirement of Gen. Scott, had become General-in-Chief of the Army, the following communication:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Dec. 21, 1861.

"SIR: You are aware that a Joint Committee has been appointed by the Senate and House of Representatives to inquire into the 'conduct of the war.' Our Committee, at a meeting held this morning, unanimously expressed a desire, before proceeding in their official duties, to have an interview with you at our room at the Capitol, at such time as may suit your convenience, in view of your pressing engagements.

"Our place of meeting is the room of the Committee on Territories of the Senate.

"I remain, very respectfully, yours,
R. F. WADE, Chairman.
"Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McCLELLAN, General Commanding Army United States."

While fully appreciating the dignity and power with which they were clothed by the concurrent action of both Houses of Congress, they deemed it but just to award to his position the consideration of asking him to confer with them in relation to the best method of fulfilling those expectations which the people had a right to hope for from an administration upon which they had, through their representatives, conferred such plenary powers. A reference to the journal of your committee will show that ill health prevented Gen. McClellan from immediately complying with this invitation. The necessities of the case, however, were so pressing and urgent that your committee concluded to proceed at once to the taking of testimony.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Soon after the battle of Bull Run, in July, 1861, Gen. McDowell was superseded, and Gen. McClellan was called by the President to the command of the army of the Potomac. The campaign in Western Virginia, the credit of which had been generally ascribed to Gen. McClellan; the favor with which it was understood he was regarded by Gen. Scott, then general-in-chief of the army of the United States; even his comparative youth, holding out the promise of active and vigorous measures; all these considerations tended to infuse hope into the public mind, and to remove the gloom and dependency which had followed the disastrous issue of the campaign just ended.

Every energy of the Government and all the resources of a generous and patriotic people were freely and lavishly placed at the disposal of Gen. McClellan to enable him to gather together another army and put it in the most complete state of efficiency, so that offensive operations might be resumed at the earliest practicable moment. The Army of the Potomac became the object of special care to every department of the Government, and all other military movements and organizations were made subordinate to the one great purpose of collecting at Washington, and organizing there, an army which should overpower the forces of the enemy, and forever crush out any hope of success which the Rebels might cherish. Even when the army of

the Potomac had attained dimensions never before contemplated in the course of military operations upon this continent, and seldom, if ever, equaled in modern times, no portion of its rapidly increasing numbers was permitted to be diverted, even for a brief period, to the accomplishment of other enterprises. The generals in charge of the various expeditions from time to time inaugurated, and from which so much benefit was anticipated—Gen. Butler, Gen. Sherman, Gen. Barnside, and others—were compelled to look elsewhere for the troops to compose their commands, to rely upon the continued patriotism of the people, and the zeal of the Executives of the various States for the raising of those regiments which would enable them to depart for the fields of duty assigned to them. No consideration was for a moment allowed to diminish or impair the efficiency of the Army of the Potomac, and the unexampled spectacle was presented to other nations, who were intently watching the course of events in this country, of the largest army of the present century being raised entirely by voluntary enlistments in the brief period of a few months.

When Congress assembled in this city, in the beginning of December, 1861, so successful had been the exertions of the authorities, and so zealously had the people responded to their country's call, that the consolidated morning reports, furnished your Committee by the Adjutant General of the army, showed that, exclusive of the command of Gen. Dix, at Baltimore, the Army of the Potomac consisted of about 185,000 men.

During the time this large army had been collecting and organizing, nothing of importance had transpired in connection with it, except the closing of the navigation of the Potomac by the Rebels, which your Committee treat of more at length in another part of this report, and the melancholy disaster of Ball's Bluff, which is made the subject of a separate report.

The weather during the Fall season, and for some weeks after the convening of Congress, continued unusually favorable for active military operations. As month after month passed without anything being done by the Army of the Potomac, the people became more and more anxious for the announcement that the work of preparation had been completed, and active operations would soon be commenced.

From the testimony before your Committee it appeared that the Army of the Potomac was well armed and equipped, and had reached a high state of discipline by the last of September or the first of October. The men were ready and eager to commence active operations. The generals in command of the various divisions were opposed to going into winter quarters, and the most of them declared they had no expectation of doing so.

CORPS ORGANIZATION.

In reference to the proper organization of so large an army as that about Washington, in order that it might be the better able to act most effectively in the field, the testimony of the witnesses examined upon that point is remarkably unanimous. The generals most familiar with the subject seemed to regard of the utmost importance the division of the army into *corps d'armée*, and that, too, in time for the instruction of the troops in the movements necessary to render such an organization the most effective. Your Committee deemed it so vitally necessary that they repeatedly brought the subject to the attention of the authorities, and urged its immediate adoption with all the arguments in their power. The President and the Secretary of War concurred with them in the necessity of such a measure; but it did not seem to be regarded with much favor by Gen. McClellan. Indeed, Gen. McClellan stated to your Committee, at the time of their conference with him, that, although it might at some time be expedient to divide the army into army corps, the subject was one of great difficulty. He said it was a delicate matter to appoint major-generals before they had been tried by actual service, and had shown their fitness to

be selected to command 30,000 or 40,000 men. A major-general could not be stowed away in a pigeon-hole, if he should prove incompetent, so easily as a brigadier-general. He proposed, therefore, to himself manage this entire army in some battle or campaign, and then select from the brigadier-generals in it such as prove themselves competent for higher commands. Consequently, the division of the army into army corps was not even begun until after the movement of the army in March had commenced, and then only in pursuance of the direct and repeated orders of the President.

Gen. McClellan, however, continued to oppose the organization of the army into army corps, as will be seen from the following dispatch to him from the Secretary of War, dated May 9, 1862:

"The President is unwilling to have the army corps organization broken up, but also unwilling that the commanding general shall be hampered and embarrassed in actual skirmishing, collision with the enemy, and on the eve of an expected great battle. You, therefore, may temporarily suspend that organization in the army under your immediate command, and adopt any you see fit, until further orders. He also writes you privately."

The provisional corps of Gen. Fitz-John Porter and Gen. Franklin were thereupon formed by reducing the other corps from three to two divisions.

STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY.

Your Committee endeavored to obtain as accurate information as possible in relation to the strength and position of the enemy in front of Washington. The testimony of the officers in our army here upon that point, however, was far from satisfactory. Early in December an order had been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commanders in the front from examining any persons who should come into our lines from the direction of the enemy, but all such persons were to be sent, without examination, to the headquarters of the army. Restrictions were also placed upon the movements of scouts. The result was, that the Generals examined appeared to be almost entirely ignorant of the force of the enemy opposed to them, having only such information as they were allowed to obtain at headquarters. The strength of the enemy was variously estimated at from 70,000 to 210,000 men. Those who formed the highest estimate based their opinion upon information received at headquarters. As to the strength of the enemy's position, the general impression seemed to be founded upon information obtained from the same source, that it was exceedingly formidable. Subsequent events have proved that the force of the enemy was below even the lowest of these estimates, and the strength of their fortifications very greatly overestimated.

DEFENSES OF WASHINGTON.

Your Committee also sought to ascertain what number of men could be spared from this army for offensive operations elsewhere, assuming that the works of the enemy in front were of such a character that it would not be advisable to move directly upon them. The estimate of the force necessary to be left in and around Washington to act entirely on the defensive, to render the capital secure against any attack of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses examined upon that point, was from 50,000 to 80,000 men, leaving 100,000 or upward that could be used for expeditions at other points.

In connection with the same subject, your Committee inquired in reference to what had been done to render the fortifications here, which had been constructed at such expense and with so great labor, most effective for the defense of Washington. Your Committee are constrained to say that adequate provision never was made to properly man those fortifications and exercise men in the management of the guns. Several of the witnesses testified that they had repeatedly called the attention of the authorities to the matter, but without success. And when the movement of the army commenced in March, the few regiments that had been placed in the forts and partially instructed in the use of the guns, were almost entirely withdrawn, leaving the

fortifications to be manned by raw and inexperienced troops.

THE BLOCKADE OF THE POTOMAC.

The subject of the obstruction of the navigation of the Potomac naturally demanded the consideration of your Committee. Upon that point your Committee would call the attention of Congress to the testimony of Capt. G. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Upon reference to his testimony, it will appear that, in June, 1861, the Navy Department proposed to the War Department that measures be adopted to take possession of Matthias Point, in order to secure the navigation of the Potomac from any danger of being interrupted. From some cause, no steps were then taken for that purpose. The subject was again brought to the attention of the War Department by the Navy Department in the month of August, shortly after the battle of Bull Run. Nothing, however, was done at that time in regard to it.

In October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged the matter upon the consideration of the War Department. The Port Royal expedition was then in preparation, and would soon be ready to start. The Navy Department represented that it would be absolutely necessary to send with that expedition, in order to insure its success, the greater portion of the Potomac flotilla, because, being very powerful vessels, of light draught, with their machinery protected, they were better fitted for that service than any other vessels in the possession of the Navy Department; and if anything was to be done by them to secure the uninterrupted navigation of the Potomac, it must be done before they left. It was proposed to the President and the War Department that the gunboats should take and destroy the Rebel batteries which had then begun to make their appearance upon the river, and which even then endangered the safety of vessels passing up and down the Potomac. When that had been done, it was proposed that a sufficient number of troops should be landed at Matthias Point, &c., to intrench themselves, under the protection of the gunboats, until they should be able, with the assistance of the smaller boats of the Potomac flotilla, to hold their position against any force the enemy would be likely to bring against them. It was represented that unless some such steps were taken the departure of those vessels upon the Port Royal expedition would be the signal for the closing of the navigation of the Potomac, which representation the result proved to be correct. As was well urged by the Navy Department, the whole question amounted simply to this: Would the army cooperate with the navy in securing the unobstructed navigation of the Potomac, or, by withholding that cooperation at that time, permit so important a channel of communication to be closed.

WHY IT WAS NOT RAISED.

After repeated efforts, Gen. McClellan promised that 4,000 men should be ready at a time named to proceed down the river. The Navy Department provided the necessary transports for the troops, and Capt. Craven, commanding the Potomac flotilla, upon being notified to that effect, collected at Matthias Point all the boats of his flotilla at the time named. The troops did not arrive, and the Navy Department was informed of the fact by Capt. Craven. Assistant Secretary Fox, upon inquiring of Gen. McClellan why the troops had not been sent according to agreement, was informed by him that his engineers were of the opinion that so large a body of troops could not be landed, and therefore he had concluded not to send them. Capt. Fox replied that the landing of the troops was a matter of which the Navy Department had charge; that they had provided the necessary means to accomplish the landing successfully; that no inquiry had been made of them in regard to that matter, and no notification that the troops were not to be sent.

It was then agreed that the troops should be sent the next night. Capt. Craven was again notified,

and again had his flotilla in readiness for the arrival of the troops. But no troops were sent down at that time, nor were any ever sent down for that purpose.

Capt. Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the Committee as to what reason was assigned for not sending the troops according to the second agreement, replied that the only reason, so far as he could ascertain, was, that Gen. McClellan feared it might bring on a general engagement.

The President, who had united with the Navy Department in urging their proposition, first upon Gen. Scott and then upon Gen. McClellan, manifested great disappointment when he learned that the plan had failed in consequence of the troops not being sent. And Capt. Craven threw up his command on the Potomac and applied to be sent to sea, saying that, by remaining here and doing nothing, he was but losing his own reputation, as the blame for permitting the Potomac to be blockaded would be imputed to him and the flotilla under his command.

Upon the failure of this plan of the Navy Department the effective vessels of the Potomac flotilla left upon the Port Royal expedition. The navigation of the river was almost immediately thereafter closed, and remained closed until the Rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries in the March following, no steps having been taken, in the meantime, for reopening communication by that route.

ORDERS TO MOVE.

On the 19th of January, 1862, the President of the United States, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, issued orders for a general movement of all the armies of the United States, one result of which was the series of victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c., which so electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal man in the land.

LINE OF OPERATIONS.

After this long period of inaction of the Army of the Potomac the President of the United States, on the 31st of January, 1862, issued the following order:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Jan. 31, 1862.
"President's Special War Order No. 1.

"Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safety for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction; all details to be in the discretion of the General-in-Chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next."
"ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

To this order Gen. McClellan wrote an elaborate reply of the same date, objecting to the plan therein indicated as involving "the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle (the Occoquan) and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy, while the other is held in check." He then proceeded to argue in favor of a movement by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahannock route. He stated that 30 days would be required to provide the necessary means of transportation. He stated that he regarded "success as certain, by all the chances of war," by the route he proposed, while it was "by no means certain that we can beat them [the enemy] at Manassas."

To this the President made the following reply:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, Feb. 3, 1862.
"MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbanna, and across land to the terminus of the railroad at York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

"1. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

"2. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

"3. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

"4. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communication, while mine would?

"5. In case of disaster, would not a safe retreat be more difficult by your plan than by mine?

"Yours, truly,

"Major-Gen. McCLELLAN."

"A LINCOLN."

Your Committee have no evidence, either oral or documentary, of the discussions that ensued or the arguments that were submitted to the consideration of the President that led him to relinquish his own line of operations and consent to the one proposed by Gen. McClellan, except the result of a council of war, held in February, 1862. That council—the first, so far as your Committee have been able to ascertain, ever called by Gen. McClellan, and then by the direction of the President—was composed of twelve generals, as follows: McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, Keyes, Fitz-John Porter, Franklin, W. F. Smith, McCall, Blenker, Andrew Porter, Barnard, and Naglee (from Gen. Hooker's Division).

To them was submitted the question whether they would indorse the line of operations which Gen. McClellan desired to adopt. The result of the deliberation was a vote of eight to four in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence down the Chesapeake Bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urbanna, and across the country to Richmond. The four Generals who voted against the proposed movement were Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman and Barnard. Gen. Keyes voted for it with the qualification that no change should be made until the enemy were driven from their batteries on the Potomac.

At this point it may be well to consider the principal arguments for and against the movement upon Richmond direct from Washington, and the movement by way of the Lower Chesapeake, including that first proposed by way of the Rappahannock river, and the one finally adopted by way of Fortress Monroe and the peninsula.

In expressing opinions upon this and other subjects relating more immediately to military operations in the field, your Committee do not undertake to form and express opinions of their own, but content themselves with setting forth those expressed in their testimony by military men whose education and experience entitle them to speak confidently upon those subjects pertaining to their profession.

WHY THE DIRECT ROUTE WAS BEST.

The arguments in favor of the direct and against the lower route to Richmond were many and weighty. Some of them are most tersely expressed in the letter of the President to Gen. McClellan, of February 3, 1862, before referred to. Beside those, the direct movement enabled the largest amount of troops to operate actively in the field, as the army in its movement immediately covered Washington, and thereby rendered the presence of a large force here unnecessary. By the adoption of the lower route a division of the army was rendered imperative, in order to provide for the safety of the Capital against any attack from the enemy. Thus, to use the language of Gen. McClellan himself, in reference to the movement proposed against the enemy while at Manassas, "committing the error of dividing our army by a very difficult obstacle, and by a distance too great to enable the two portions to support each other, should either be attacked by the masses of the enemy while the other is held in check."

The army in moving direct from Washington avoided all the delays and disorder consequent upon the embarkation and disembarkation of so large a force with all its material. And by investing Richmond on the north and north-west, we cut them off from one of their great sources of supply, the Shenandoah Valley, and at the same time prevented their raids through that region of country, which so paralyzed all efforts to send the few troops left in Washington to the assistance of the army on the peninsula.

Gen. McClellan states in his testimony that by adopting the route by way of Annapolis and the Rappahannock, he hoped, if proper secrecy was pre-

served, to be able to reach the vicinity of Richmond before the Rebel army at Manassas could be concentrated there for its defense. Whatever probability there may have been for the realization of such a hope at the time the Rappahannock route was decided upon, it was entirely removed when the enemy evacuated Manassas, before any actual movement was made by our army. And Gen. McClellan at once relinquished the Rappahannock route, and decided, with the concurrence of his corps commanders, to go by way of Yorktown and the peninsula.

One great objection to the peninsula route, as indicated by the testimony of all the witnesses who testify upon that point, including Gen. McClellan himself, was the total want of information in reference to the nature of the country there, the kind and condition of the roads, the preparations for defense, &c. The difficulties and embarrassments our army labored under from the beginning of that campaign, from that want of information, are very evident from the testimony.

DECISION OF THE COUNCIL.

The decision of the council of twelve Generals in February was to move by way of Annapolis and thence to the Rappahannock. The question of reopening the navigation of the Potomac, by driving the enemy from their batteries upon the river, was discussed. It was, however, finally decided that the enemy should be left in possession of their batteries, and the movement should be made without disturbing them. This is proven by the testimony, and also by the second paragraph of the order of the President, dated March 8, 1862, as follows:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, March 8, 1862.

"President's General War Order No. 3.

"Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as, in the opinion of the General-in-Chief, and the Commanders of all the Army Corps, shall leave the said city entirely secure.

"That no more than two Army Corps (about fifty thousand troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved en route for a new base of operations until the navigation of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake Bay shall be freed from the enemy's batteries and other obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give express permission.

"That any movement aforesaid en route for a new base of operations, which may be ordered by the General-in-Chief, and which may be intended to move upon the Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the Bay as early as the 18th March inst., and the General-in-Chief shall be responsible that it so move as early as that day.

"Ordered, That the Army and Navy co-operate in an immediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay.

"ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

"L. THOMAS, Adj't.-Gen."

Before the movement by way of Annapolis could be executed, the enemy abandoned their batteries upon the Potomac, and evacuated their position at Centreville and Manassas, retiring to the line of the Rappahannock.

MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY.

When Gen. McClellan, then in the City of Washington, heard that the enemy had evacuated Manassas, he proceeded across the river and ordered a general movement of the whole army in the direction of the position lately occupied by the enemy. The army moved on the morning of the 10th of March, the greater part of it proceeding no further than Fairfax Court-House. A small force of the army proceeded to Manassas and beyond to the line of the Rappahannock, ascertaining that the enemy had retired beyond that river and destroyed the railroad bridge across it.

On the 11th of March Gen. McClellan ordered, by telegraph, the transports from Annapolis to Washington (Alexandria?), to embark the army from there, and informed the Department that he proposed to occupy Manassas with a portion of Gen. Banks's command, and throw all the force he could concentrate upon the line previously determined upon. Subsequent events in the valley of the Shenandoah, terminating, for a time, in the battle of Winchester, of March 23, prevented the force under Gen. Banks from leaving that valley.

ANOTHER COUNCIL.

On the 13th of March Gen. McClellan convened at Fairfax Court-House a council of war, consisting of four of the five commanders of army corps (Gen. Banks being absent), and informed them that he proposed to abandon his plan of movement by way of the Rappahannock, and submitted to them instead a plan of movement by way of York and James Rivers. The result of the deliberations of that council was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

"FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, March 13, 1862. }
"A council of the Generals commanding army corps at the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac were of the opinion:

"First: That the enemy, having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and the Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James Rivers, upon Richmond; provided, first, that the enemy's vessel, the Merrimack, can be neutralized; second, the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria; move down the Potomac; third, that a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in York River; fourth, that the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace. Unanimous.

"Second: If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for supplying the army, should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Aquia and Richmond Railroads. Unanimous.

"Note.—That with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice. (Keyes, Heintzelman and McDowell.) A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)"

The same day Gen. McClellan informed the War Department that "the Council of Commanders of Army Corps have unanimously agreed upon a plan of operations, and Gen. McDowell will at once proceed with it to Washington and lay it before you."

To this the Secretary of War replied: "Whatever plan has been agreed upon proceed at once to execute, without losing an hour for my approval."

THE PRESIDENT'S ORDERS.

The plan of operations was submitted to the President on the same day, and he approved the same; but gave the following directions as to its execution:

"First: Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess himself of that position and line of communication.

"Second: Leave Washington secure.

"Third: Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, choosing a new base at Porters Monroe, or anywhere between here and there; or, at all events, move such remainder of the army at once, in pursuit of the enemy, by some route."

EMBARKATION OF THE ARMY.

The army was directed to return to Alexandria to be embarked for the peninsula; previous to their embarkation all the corps to be concentrated upon the division nearest Alexandria. The transportation not proving sufficient for immediate embarkation, the troops were, for several days, exposed to the rains which then set in, being deprived of their former camping accommodations, although, in many instances, not far distant from them, having only shelter tents to protect them from the inclemency of the weather.

To Gen. McDowell was at first assigned the advance of the expedition. But when it was found that there was not transportation enough to embark at once his entire corps, he consented, in order to utilize what was there, to allow his troops to remain until such time as they could be moved together, with the understanding that the troops preceding him should not operate upon his proposed field of labor. The result, however, was, that the corps of Gen. McDowell was put off till the last, which, in pursuance of subsequent orders, led to his corps being retained here for the defense of Washington.

HOW WASHINGTON WAS LEFT UNDEFENDED.

By reference to the President's general war order, No. 3 of March 3, 1862, it will be seen that no

change of base of operations of the army of the Potomac was to be made without leaving in and about Washington such a force as in the opinion not only of Gen. McClellan, but of "the commanders of all the army corps," was sufficient to render the capital entirely secure. And by reference to the report of the council of war held at Fairfax Court-House, on the 13th of March, 1862, consisting of Gens. McDowell, Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, it will be seen that three members of that council deemed necessary for the safety of Washington "that the forts on the right bank of the Potomac should be fully garrisoned; those on the left bank occupied, and a covering force of 25,000 men." The other General (Sumner) deemed 40,000 men all sufficient.

Notwithstanding this order of the President, and the decision of the council, when Gen. McClellan himself left Alexandria for the peninsula, he sent back orders, without conference with the commanders of corps, for all the corps of the Army of the Potomac, but that of Gen. Banks, to embark at once for the peninsula. Just previous to leaving, Gen. McClellan addressed the following communication to the Adjutant-General of the army:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC."

"STEAMER COMMODORE, April 1, 1862."

"GENERAL: I have to request that you will lay the following recommendation before the Honorable Secretary of War: 'The approximate numbers and positions of the rear and in rear of the Army of the Potomac are about as follows:—'

"Gen. Dix has, after guarding the railroads under his charge, sufficient troops to give him 5,000 for the defense of Baltimore, and 1,500 available for the Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort Delaware is very well garrisoned by about 400 men.

"The garrisons of the forts around Washington amount to 10,000 men; other disposable troops, with Gen. Wadsworth, being about 11,400.

"The troops employed in guarding the railways in Maryland amount to some 3,350 men. These it is designed to relieve, being old regiments, by dismounted cavalry, and to send them forward to Manassas.

"The Adjutant-General is to employ Warrenton with a force which, including Col. Geary at White Plains, and the cavalry to be at his disposal, will amount to some 7,700 men, with 15 pieces of artillery.

"I have the honor to request that all the troops organized for service in Pennsylvania and in New-York, and in many of the Eastern States, may be ordered to Washington. I learn from Gov. Curtin that there are some 3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. This force I should be glad to have sent at once to Manassas. Four thousand men from Gen. Wadsworth I desire to be ordered to Manassas. These troops, with the railroad guards above alluded to, will make up a force, under Gen. Auercomb, to something like 14,000.

"It is my design to pass Gen. Denker's division from Warrenton upon S. R. bridge. He should remain at Strasburg, too, to allow matters to assume a definite form in that region before proceeding to his ultimate destination.

"The troops in the Valley of the Shenandoah will thus be, including 11th Regt's division, 10,000 strong, with 24 pieces of artillery. Banks's fifth corps, which embraces Gen. Shields's, 19,687 strong, with 41 guns; some 3,350 disposable cavalry, and the railroad guards, about 2,100 men, amount to about 33,157 men.

"It is designed to relieve Gen. Hooker by some regiment—say 8,000 men, leaving, with 500 cavalry, 1,350 men on the Lower Potomac.

"To recapitulate:

"At Warrenton there is to be..... 7,700 men.

"At Manassas there is to be..... 10,000 men.

"In the Valley of the Shenandoah..... 35,407 men.

"On the Lower Potomac..... 1,350 men.

"In all..... 54,456 men.

"There will thus be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under Gen. Wadsworth, 13,000 men, exclusive of the batteries under instruction.

"The troops organizing, or ready for service in New-York, I learn will probably number more than 4,000. These should be assembled at Washington, subject to disposition where most needed. I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, Major-Gen. Commanding.

"BRIG-GEN. THOMAS, Adjutant-General U. S. Army."

This statement, to use the expression of one of the witnesses, was "very indefinite." Gen. Wadsworth, who had been ordered to take charge of the defenses of Washington, upon learning the dispositions of troops proposed by Gen. McClellan, and feeling the great importance of the trust committed to his charge, and the total inadequacy of the means provided him for that purpose, addressed to the Secretary of War the following communication:

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON."

"WASHINGTON, D. C., April 2, 1862."

"SIR: I have the honor to submit the following condensed statements of the forces left under my command for the defenses of Washington:

Infantry..... 15,335
Artillery..... 4,294
Cavalry, six companies only mounted,..... 648

Total..... 20,277
Deduct sick and in arrest and confinement..... 1,455

Total present for duty..... 19,022

"I have no mounted light artillery under my command.
"Several companies of the reserve artillery of the Army of the Potomac are still here, but not under my command or fit for service.

"From this force I am ordered by Gen. McClellan to detail two regiments (good ones) to John Richardson's division (Sumner's corps) as it passes through Alexandria; one regiment to replace the 37th New-York Volunteers in Heintzelman's old division; one regiment to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Bull's ferry—total, 4 regiments.

"I am further ordered this morning by telegraph to send 4,000 men to relieve Gen. Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton, that he may be enabled to forthwith.

"In regard to the change and efficiency of the troops under my command, I have to state that nearly all the troops are new and have just been drilled; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition from various causes, which it is not necessary to state here; several regiments having been relieved from brigades, which have gone to the field, in consequence of their usefulness in service—the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place.

"Two heavy artillery regiments, and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for some months in artillery service, have been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and I have only been able to fill their places with very new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position.

"I am not informed as to the position which Major-Gen. Banks is directed to take; but at this time he is, as I understand, on the other side of the Bull Run mountains, leaving my command to cover the front, from the Manassas Gap (about 20 miles beyond Manassas) to Aquia Creek.

"I deem it my duty to state that, looking at the numerical strength and character of the force under my command, it is in my judgment entirely inadequate, and, in addition, the important duty to which it is assigned. I regard it very improbable that the enemy will avoid an attack point, but this belief is based upon the hope that they may be promptly engaged elsewhere, and may not learn the number and the character of this force left here.

"I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

"JAS. S. WADSWORTH.

"Brig-Gen. and Military Governor.

"Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR."

These communications were brought to the consideration of the President by the Secretary of War. The subject was at once referred to the Adjutant-General of the Army, and Major-Gen. E. A. Hitchcock, with instructions to report at once whether the orders of the President had been complied with.

Their report is as follows:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., April 2, 1862—7:40 o'clock.

"In compliance with your instructions, I have examined the papers submitted to me, and have the honor to make the following report:

"First: The President's war order, No. 3, dated March 8, requires that on taking up any new base of operations, the City of Washington shall be left entirely secure. The other points of the order it is unnecessary to consider, as the enemy, since its date, have abandoned their positions and batteries on the Potomac, and retired behind the Rappahannock.

"Second: The council of general officers held at Fairfax Court-House, March 13, took place after the enemy had retired from Manassas and destroyed the railroad in their rear. The council decided unanimously to take up a new base of operations from Fort Monroe, and three of the generals—a majority—decided that the force necessary to be left should be sufficient to fully garrison the forts on the right bank of the Potomac, and 'to occupy' those on the left bank, with a covering force of 25,000. It is, we think, the judgment of officers that some 20,000 men would be necessary thus to man these forts, with the number of the covering force, would make a total of 55,000.

"Third: The President's directions of March 13 to Gen. McClellan direct, first, to leave such a force at Manassas Junction as shall make it entirely certain that the enemy may not repossess it; second, that Washington shall be left entirely secure; third, that the remainder of the army move down the Potomac, or move in pursuit of the enemy. In regard to occupying Manassas Junction, as the enemy have destroyed the railroad leading to it, it may be fairly assumed that they have no intention of returning for the reconquest of their late position, and therefore no very large force would be necessary to hold that position.

"Fourth: Major-General McClellan's report to the Adjutant-General, of April 1, after giving the several positions of the troops proposed to be left for the defense of Washington,

gives a representation as follows: At Warrenton there is to be 7,730; at Manassas, say, 10,353; in the valley of the Shenandoah, 35,407; on the Lower Potomac, 1,350. Total in all, 55,445. And there would be left for the garrisons and the front of Washington, under Gen. Wadsworth, some 19,000. In the above enumeration, Gen. Banks's Army Corps is included; but whether this corps, operating in the Shenandoah Valley, should be regarded as a part of the force available for the protection of the immediate front of Washington, the undersigned express no opinion.

17th: Gen. Wadsworth's report of April 2d gives his force as follows: infantry, 15,335; artillery, 4,494; cavalry, 836—six companies only being mounted. Total, 20,477.

Deduct: sick, in arrest and confinement, 1,455. Total for duty, 19,022.

From this force Gen. Wadsworth is directed to detach two good regiments to Richardson's division, Sumner's corps, which should be deducted from his command, one regiment to replace the 37th New-York, in Heintzelman's old division, and one to relieve a regiment of Hooker's division at Budd's Ferry—total, four regiments.

It is also ordered to send 4,000 men to relieve Sumner at Manassas and Warrenton. Gen. Wadsworth represents that he has no mounted light artillery under his command; states that there were several companies of reserve artillery still here, but not under his command, or fit for service.

Gen. Wadsworth further reports that nearly all the force is new and imperfectly disciplined; that several of the regiments are in a very disorganized condition, some of them having been relieved from brigades which have gone into the field, in consequence of their unfitness for service, the best regiments remaining having been selected to take their place; two heavy artillery regiments and one infantry regiment, which had been drilled for months in artillery service, having been withdrawn from the forts on the south side of the Potomac, and their places supplied with new infantry regiments, entirely unacquainted with the duties of that arm, and of little or no value in their present position. If there was need of a military force for the safety of the City of Washington within its own limits, that referred to in the report of Gen. Wadsworth would seem to be entirely inadequate.

In view of the opinion expressed by the council of the commanders of army corps of the force necessary for the defense of the capital, though not numerically stated, and of the force represented by Gen. McClellan as left for that purpose, we are of the opinion that the requirements of the President, that the city shall be left 'entirely secure,' not only in the opinion of the general-in-chief, but that of the commanders of the army corps' also, has not been fully complied with.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

L. THOMAS, Adj.-Gen.

E. A. HITCHCOCK, Maj.-Gen. U. S. A.

THE PRESIDENT PROTECTS THE CAPITAL.

The day after this report was written, the President directed the Secretary of War to order one corps of the Army of the Potomac to remain in front of Washington until further orders. The corps of Gen. McDowell, being the only corps remaining intact here, was selected to remain, without the knowledge of Gen. McDowell, he being engaged, at the time of receiving this order, in making preparations to immediately follow the rest of the army to the peninsula.

THE PENINSULA CAMPAIGN.

Gen. Heintzelman, who commanded the first troops of the army of the Potomac that landed on the peninsula, arrived at Fortress Monroe on the 23d of March, two weeks after the evacuation of Manassas. He had orders to encamp as near Fortress Monroe as possible, in order that the enemy should have no idea of the direction in which the army was to move, whether toward Yorktown or Norfolk. Gen. Heintzelman states that shortly after landing he obtained information that the enemy had not more than 10,000 troops at Yorktown and on the Peninsula, and is satisfied that he could have advanced and isolated Yorktown, in which case there would have been no serious obstacle in the way of proceeding directly to Richmond. On the 27th of March he sent out reconnoitering parties as far as Big Bethel and Watt's Creek, and went near the Half-way House, where about 400 of the enemy, and a little artillery were seen. He telegraphed to Gen. McClellan what he was doing, and received a dispatch, in reply, that he (Gen. McClellan) hoped that nothing had been done to give the enemy information of the line of operations of the army. The reconnaissance was then withdrawn.

Troops continued to arrive at Fortress Monroe, and on the 2d of April Gen. McClellan himself arrived. On the 4th of April the army commenced its movement in the direction of Yorktown, and on the

5th appeared before the enemy's lines. Gen. McClellan states that he moved from Fortress Monroe sooner than he otherwise would have done, upon hearing that the enemy were sending down reinforcements.

DELAY BEFORE YORKTOWN.

All the testimony goes to prove that when our troops first landed on the Peninsula the force of the enemy there consisted of Magruder's command, variously estimated at from 7,000 to 12,000 men, except by Gen. McClellan, who estimates it from 15,000 to 20,000. The Hon. Lemuel J. Bowden, United States Senator from Virginia—then living within the Rebel lines, near Williamsburg—testifies that *the Rebels did not determine to re-enforce Magruder until it was apparent that our forces intended to stop before Yorktown and commence a regular siege of the place.* It is now evident, whatever may have been the opinion of our officers at the time, that *our forces, when they first appeared before Yorktown, could have pierced the line of works across the Peninsula there without much difficulty, isolating Yorktown, and cutting off re-enforcements, when the place must have fallen in a very short time.* Some of our Generals expected and desired that that should be done. Gen. Heintzelman forwarded to Gen. McClellan the application of Gen. Hamilton, commanding a division, for permission to force the enemy's lines. No answer was received to the application.

HOW MANY TROOPS MCCLELLAN HAD.

Instead of that, however, a siege was determined upon, contrary to the desire of the President, who, as early as the 9th of April, wrote to Gen. McClellan as follows:

"There is a curious mystery about the number of troops now with you. I telegraphed you on the 6th, asking that you had over 100,000 men. I had just obtained from the Secretary of War a statement, taken, as he said, from your own returns, making 108,000 then with you and en route to you. You now say that you will have not 85,000, when all en route to you shall have reached you. How can this discrepancy of 25,000 be accounted for? As to Gen. Wool's command, I understand it is doing for you precisely what a like number of your own would have to do if that command was away."

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time, and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will steadily gain on you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and re-enforcements than you can by re-enforcements alone."

"And, once more, let me tell you it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always wished not going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, as only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we should find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched position is but the story of Manassas repeated."

And the repetition was made complete nearly a month later, when the enemy, in the face of a superior force, evacuated their works without loss and without the knowledge of the general commanding our army.

MCCLELLAN WANTS MORE TROOPS.

Gen. McClellan, however, did not deem his forces sufficient, and objected very strongly to the order of the President detaching McDowell's corps for the defense of Washington, as "imperiling the success of our cause." He called again and again for reinforcements, asking for Franklin's and McCall's Divisions of McDowell's corps, to be under command of Franklin; insisting that Franklin's Division, at least, should be sent to him. On the 11th of April Franklin's Division was ordered to Alexandria to embark for Fort Monroe. On the 14th, Gen. Franklin reported to Gen. McClellan near Yorktown, but his troops remained on board the transports until after the enemy evacuated the place, when they were ordered to West Point.

HE WANTS TRANSPORTATION.

On the 6th of April Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the President, "I have by no means the transportation I must have to move my army even a few miles;" and asks that all his orders for wagon trains,

&c., may at once be complied with. All was sent to him as desired, until even Gen. McDowell found himself so stripped of the transportation designed for his corps, that when he moved to Fredericksburg it was with the greatest difficulty he could move supplies for his small force from Aquia to Falmouth until the railroad was completed.

A month was spent before Yorktown, our army, in the opinion of some of our ablest officers, becoming more demoralized by the labors of a long siege than it would have been even by an unsuccessful assault.

The returns in the Adjutant-General's office, signed by Gen. McClellan and his Adjutant-General, show that on the 30th of April, 1862, the forces on the Peninsula under Gen. McClellan amounted to 112,392 present for duty.

HE WANTS GUNS.

On the 1st of May the President telegraphs to Gen. McClellan: "Your call for Parrott guns from Washington alarms me, chiefly because it argues indefinite procrastination. Is anything to be done?"

YORKTOWN EVACUATED—M'CLELLAN CHAGRINED.

On the night of the 3d and the morning of the 4th of May, the enemy evacuated Yorktown without loss. One of the witnesses testifies that Gen. McClellan was very much chagrined and mortified at the evacuation, as he had made his preparations to open from his batteries on Monday, the 5th of May.

PURSUIT OF THE REBELS.

The evacuation was discovered by daylight on the morning of the 4th. Between 10 and 11 o'clock, Gen. Stoneman, with the cavalry and some light horse artillery, started in pursuit. About 1 o'clock, Gen. Hooker, with his division, left Yorktown, with orders to support Gen. Stoneman. Gen. Sumner, Heintzelman and Keyes also moved out during the day, with the whole or portions of their corps. About five miles from Yorktown the division of Gen. Hooker was delayed for some time in consequence of other troops, coming from another direction, getting into the road before him.

In the meantime Gen. Stoneman had overtaken the rear of the enemy with his cavalry, and followed them up closely, keeping up a running fire all the time, until the enemy reached their works in the neighborhood of Williamsburg, when the pursuit was checked. Gov. Sprague was sent back to hurry up the infantry support under Gen. Hooker. After considerable delay, finding it impossible to pass the troops ahead of him, Gen. Hooker turned off and proceeded by another road, of which he had obtained information from some of the inhabitants; marched till 11 o'clock that night, renewed the march at daylight, and came up to the advanced works of the enemy a little after 7 o'clock, about half a mile from Fort Magruder, and at once engaged the enemy.

BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG.

There seems to have been great misapprehension and confusion in relation to the management of the troops at Williamsburg. When the pursuit first commenced on Sunday, Gen. Heintzelman was instructed by Gen. McClellan to take charge of operations in front. On the morning of Monday orders were sent to Gen. Sumner to take the command; Gen. McClellan remained behind in Yorktown to superintend the sending of two divisions up the York River to West Point. A heavy rain set in on Sunday, rendering the roads almost impracticable for the passage of troops. The troops of the different commands became mingled—divisions and brigades, to some extent, were separated from each other—and it seems to have been difficult to get the troops up in time.

During Monday forenoon Gen. Hooker, finding himself hard pressed by the enemy, and understanding that Gen. Sumner had 30,000 troops with him, sent repeatedly for reinforcements. So did Gen. Stoneman and Gen. Heintzelman, but no reinforcements arrived. Gen. Sumner states that, having sent Gen. Hancock to the right, he had at the center

only about 3,000 infantry—the cavalry there not being fitted for operations against the enemy, on account of the country being so wooded. Upon receiving the call for reinforcements to be sent to the left to Gen. Hooker, he sent staff officers to hurry up troops from the rear, his own corps being some ten miles off, and ordered Kearney to re-enforce Hooker. Re-enforcements not coming up to Gen. Hooker as soon as needed, or perhaps expected, the Prince de Joinville and Gov. Sprague went to Yorktown to urge Gen. McClellan to come up to the front, and take charge of matters there. Gov. Sprague arrived at Yorktown about 1 o'clock, having been about an hour in going down. He testifies that when Gen. McClellan was told the condition of affairs at the front, he remarked that he had supposed "those in front could attend to that little matter." After some time Gen. McClellan started from Yorktown, and reached the vicinity of Williamsburg about 5 o'clock in the afternoon.

HOOKEE DOES THE FIGHTING.

By that time Gen. Kearney had reached the field and re-enforced Gen. Hooker, taking command, being the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker. Gen. Hancock had been engaged on the right, but, upon being re-enforced, had succeeded in repulsing the enemy, losing about forty men. The principal fighting was done by the troops under Gen. Hooker, his division sustaining a loss of about 1,700 men. Before he was re-enforced, his troops were obliged to hold their position with the bayonet and such ammunition as the men could obtain from the bodies of those who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that it was impossible to bring up fresh ammunition.

RETREAT AND PURSUIT.

That night the enemy evacuated their position at Williamsburg. Gen. McClellan states that after he arrived on the field he was so satisfied that the enemy had been beaten and would be compelled to evacuate their position that night or be taken at a great disadvantage, that he countermanded orders to the divisions of Richardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to Yorktown.

The next day the pursuit was continued for a short distance by Gen. Stoneman and the cavalry, with a small body of infantry. Several of the Generals testify that, had the enemy been promptly followed up after the battle of Williamsburg, they could have been followed right into Richmond—one of them says without firing a gun. Gen. McClellan says that the roads were so bad, in consequence of the rains, that it was impracticable to make a vigorous pursuit.

The battle of Williamsburg appears to have been fought under many and serious disadvantages. Nothing was known of the nature of the country or the defensive works of the enemy until our troops arrived before them; there was no controlling mind in charge of the movements; there was uncertainty in regard to who was in command; each General fought as he considered best; and, by the time the General Commanding appeared on the field, the principal part of the fighting was over.

FURTHER DELAY.

Some three or four days were spent at Williamsburg for the purpose of bringing up supplies, &c., and then the line of march was taken up for the Chickahominy. It was about the time that the army left Williamsburg that Norfolk was taken and the Merrimac destroyed. But preparations had been made before those events occurred to have supplies sent up York River instead of the James, and the line afterwards followed was adopted. The consequence was that the gunboats were of little or no service in the operations against Richmond, and remained entirely inactive, except in some operations against Fort Darling, until they were called upon to protect the army when, in July, it fell back to the James River.

The distance between Williamsburg and the line of operations on the Chickahominy was from forty to fifty miles, and the army was most two weeks

in moving that distance. The first troops that crossed the Chickahominy were the corps of General Keyes, which crossed on the 24th of May, followed by the corps of Gen. Heintzelman on the 25th. The rest of our army remained on the left bank of the Chickahominy until the battle of Fair Oaks, when the corps of Gen. Sumner crossed to the assistance of Gen. Heintzelman and Keyes.

M'CLELLAN STILL CALLING FOR MORE TROOPS.

Gen. McClellan continued calling for re-enforcements, representing that the force of the enemy in his front was superior to his own, and that the force under Gen. McDowell would do more for the protection of Washington, if sent to his army, than in any other position in which it could be placed. In a letter written on the 21st of May he asks that Gen. McDowell's corps be sent to him by water rather than by land, as the more expeditious mode, and that he and his forces be explicitly placed under his orders, "in the ordinary way." He closes his letter by saying:

"I believe there is a great struggle before this army, but I am neither dismayed nor discouraged. I wish to strengthen its force as much as I can, in any event, I shall fight it with all the skill, and caution, and determination that I possess. And I trust that the result may either obtain for me the permanent confidence of my Government, or that it may close my career."

In reply to the request of General McClellan that General McDowell should join his forces by water, the President states, on the 21st of May:

"McDowell can reach you by land sooner than he could get aboard of boats if the boats were ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shall be resisted, in which case the force resisting him will not be confronting you at Richmond. By land he will reach you in five days after starting; whereas, by water, he would not reach you in two weeks, judging by past experience. Franklin's single division did not reach you in ten days after I ordered it."

JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH.

Preparations were accordingly made for General McDowell to leave Fredericksburg on the 25th of May to join Gen. McClellan. Just at that time, however, Jackson commenced his expedition down the Shenandoah Valley, and Gen. McDowell, together with Gen. Fremont, from Western Virginia, was sent to the assistance of Gen. Banks, and to intercept Jackson in his retreat. Upon being informed of this, Gen. McClellan replied that the movement of Jackson was probably intended to prevent re-enforcements being sent to him. The President replied, giving him full information as to the condition of affairs in the valley, and closed by saying:

"If McDowell's forces are now beyond our reach he should be utterly helpless. Apprehensions of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, has always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this, and do the best you can with the forces you now have."

BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.

On the 31st of May and the 1st of June the battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks were fought. As there has been so much controversy in regard to the conduct of some of the troops engaged in that battle, your Committee will refer more particularly to the testimony of Gen. Casey, who commanded the advanced division, upon which the attack was first made. Gen. Casey states that, when the campaign of the Peninsula commenced, his division consisted principally of raw and inexperienced troops. They had suffered greatly from the labors and exposures incident upon the siege of Yorktown and the advance of the troops up the Peninsula. Some of them had been for weeks without shelter, being compelled to leave their camp equipage behind when ordered on the pursuit of the enemy after the evacuation of Yorktown. That division took the lead across the Chickahominy, taking up a position at Seven Pines, where it established itself by throwing up intrenchments and cutting abatis.

A few days before the battle of Seven Pines, contrary to the advice and opinion of Gen. Keyes and Gen. Casey, the division was ordered three-quarters of a mile to the front, within six miles of Richmond, his pickets extending within five miles. They had no support on their right or their left, the remainder of the corps to which they belonged (Keyes's) being

in their rear. They at once commenced digging rifle-pits and cutting abatis, the pickets at night being attacked by the enemy, who were repulsed. About 11 o'clock on the morning of the 31st the pickets reported the enemy approaching, and an aide of Gen. Johnston was captured and brought in with important papers upon him. Gen. Casey, with this aid and his general officer of the day, went to Gen. Keyes and reported the circumstances to him. Gen. Keyes testified that for some days before the attack he sent to Gen. McClellan reports of his condition, the threatening attitude of the enemy in his immediate vicinity, and urged that Gen. Sumner be sent across to his support. This was not done, however, until after the attack commenced. Reports continued to come in of the approach of the enemy. The division was called out and formed, the working men called in, and preparations made to meet the coming attack. Two lines of battle were formed—one in the rifle-pits, and another about one-third of a mile in advance—composed of five or six regiments and four pieces of artillery. A regiment had previously been sent out to support the pickets. About 20 minutes to 1 o'clock the enemy commenced the attack in force, supposed to amount to about 35,000 men, attacking in front and on both flanks. After fighting for some time, the enemy continuing to come on in force, the forces in front fell back to the rifle-pits, and fought there until nearly surrounded. Re-enforcements had been promised, and Gen. Casey had selected the position to which they were to be assigned; but no re-enforcements came up to his position until just before he was forced to fall back from his second line, when a single regiment arrived. After about three hours' fighting the division fell back from its second line with a loss of 1,433 in killed, wounded, and missing. In the course of an hour after Casey's division had been driven back, the remainder of our forces were swept back from a mile and a half to two miles from Casey's first line, when the enemy were checked, and the fighting ceased for the day.

During the battle Gen. Sumner, whose corps was on the left bank of the Chickahominy, was ordered by Gen. McClellan to hold his forces in readiness to cross. Gen. Sumner not only did that, but at once called out his forces and moved them out to the heads of the columns were at the bridges ready to cross, thereby saving between one and two hours. When the order came to cross he immediately moved his forces in the direction of the field of battle, came up with and engaged the enemy, and relieved the pressure upon the troops engaged upon his left.

BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS.

The next day, the 1st of June, the enemy attacked Gen. Sumner at Fair Oaks. Gen. Hooker, who had been ordered forward the day before by Gen. Heintzelman with one-half of his division, hearing the firing of the enemy upon Gen. Sumner's forces, proceeded at once in that direction and engaged the enemy. In a short time the enemy were repulsed, and fell back in confusion. There was no communication between the forces under Gen. Sumner and those under Gen. Heintzelman (Hooker's), but each fought as he deemed best under the circumstances. Gen. McClellan was with the main part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After the fighting was over he came across to the right bank of the river.

HOOKE'S RECONNOISSANCE.

On the morning of Monday Gen. Heintzelman ordered Gen. Hooker to make a reconnoissance in force, which he did, advancing to within four miles of Richmond, meeting with no resistance except a little from the enemy's pickets. Upon being informed by Gen. Heintzelman of what he had done, Gen. McClellan ordered the troops to be recalled and occupy the position that had been held by Casey's division.

The officers engaged in that battle, who have been examined, testify that the army could have pushed right on to the City of Richmond with little resistance; that the enemy were very much broken and demoralized, throwing away arms, clothing, &c.,

that might impede their flight. Gen. McClellan seems to have contemplated an immediate movement upon Richmond, for, the day after the battle, June 2, he writes to the Secretary of War:

"The enemy attacked in force and with great spirit yesterday morning, but are everywhere most efficiently repulsed with great loss. Our troops, engaged frequently on both days and uniformly broke the enemy. The result is, that our left is within four miles of Richmond. I only wait for the river to fall to cross with the rest of the force and make a general attack. Should I find them holding firm in a very strong position, I may wait for what troops I can bring up from Fort Monroe. But the morale of my troops is now such that I can venture much. I do not fear for odds against me. The victory is complete, and all credit is due to the gallantry of our officers and men."

The movement was not made, however, as Gen. McClellan states, because of the high stage of water and the bad roads.

MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS.

On the 6th of June McCall's division of Gen. McDowell's corps was ordered to join the army on the peninsula. On the 8th of June Gen. McClellan telegraphs: "I shall be in perfect readiness to move forward and take Richmond the moment that McClellan reaches here and the ground will admit the passage of artillery." On the 10th or 11th of June McCall's troops commenced arriving at the White House.

Preparations continued to be made in Washington to send down by land from Fredericksburg the remainder of Gen. McDowell's corps, he being directed to co-operate fully with Gen. McClellan, but retaining an independent command. This does not appear to have been in accordance with General McClellan's wishes; for, on the 16th of June, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War:

"It ought to be distinctly understood that McDowell and his troops are completely under my control. I received a telegram from him requesting that McCall's division might be placed at his disposal immediately upon his arrival. That request does not breathe the proper spirit; whatever troops are sent me will be placed at my disposal to do the most good. I do not feel that in such circumstances as those in which I am now placed Gen. McDowell should wish to exercise his command. If I cannot fully control all his troops I want none of them, but would prefer to fight the battle with what I have, and let others be responsible for the result."

On the 18th of June, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the Secretary of War that he has received information from deserters to the effect that troops have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson; that the movement commenced on the 8th; and that if re-enforcements have gone to Jackson, they are probably not less than 10,000 men; that he cannot vouch for the truth of the statement, but that it seems pretty certain that it is believed in Richmond and among the Rebel troops. To this the President replies, on the same day, that the information is corroborated by a dispatch from Gen. King at Fredericksburg, and remarks: "If this is true, it is as good as a re-enforcement to you of an equal force."

On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs to the President:

"A general engagement may take place at any hour. An advance by us involves a battle more or less decisive. The enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works. If ten or fifteen thousand men have left Richmond to re-enforce Jackson, it illustrates their strength and confidence. After to-morrow we shall fight the Rebel army as soon as Providence will permit. We shall await only a favorable condition of the earth and sky, and the completion of some necessary preliminaries."

STRENGTH OF THE ARMY.

The returns of Gen. McClellan to the Adjutant-General's office give the following as the strength of the army on the peninsula on the 20th of June: Present for duty, 115,102; special duty, sick and in arrest, 12,225; absent, 23,511—total, 150,838.

STUART'S RAID:

About this time the Rebel General, Stuart, with his cavalry, made his celebrated raid, making the entire circuit of our army unharmed, and discovering the nature of our communications with the York River.

JACKSON THREATENS AN ATTACK.

On the 24th and 25th of June, Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he is informed by deserters and contrabands that Jackson is contemplating an attack upon his right and rear. As this dispatch of Gen. McClellan, and the one of the President in reply, are dated immediately previous to the "seven days' battle," they are given here in full.

"Received 8.50 p. m.

MCCLELLAN's, June 25—6.15 p. m.

"I have just returned from the field, and find your dispatch in regard to Jackson. Several contrabands, just in, give information confirming the supposition that Jackson's advance is at or near Hanover Court-House, and that Beauregard arrived, with strong reinforcements, in Richmond yesterday. I incline to think that Jackson will attack my right and rear. The Rebel force is stated at 200,000, including Jackson and Beauregard. I shall have to contend against vastly superior odds if these reports be true; but this army will do all in the power of man to hold their position and repulse an attack. I regret my great inferiority of numbers, but feel that I am in no way responsible for it, as I have not failed to represent repeatedly the necessity of re-enforcements; that this was the decisive point; and that all the available means of the Government should be concentrated here. I will do all that a general can do with the splendid army I have the honor to command, and if it is destroyed by overwhelming numbers, can at least do with it, and change its face. But if the result of the action which will occur to-morrow, or within a short time, is a disaster, the responsibility cannot be thrown on my shoulders; it must rest where it belongs."

"Since I commenced this, I have received additional intelligence confirming the supposition in regard to Jackson's movements and Beauregard's. I shall probably be attacked to-morrow, and now go to the other side of the Chickahominy to arrange for the defense on that side. I feel that there is no use in my again asking for re-enforcements."

"GEO. B. MCCLELLAN, Major-General.

"Hon. E. M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

The answer of the President is as follows:

"WASHINGTON, June 26, 1862.

"Your three dispatches of yesterday in relation to the affair, ending with the statement that you completely succeeded in making your point, are very gratifying."

"The latter one of 6 1/2 p. m., suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000 men, and talking of whom the responsibility will belong to, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the supposition that you will do the best you can with what you have; while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted, I shall omit, no opportunity to send you re-enforcements whenever I possibly can."

"A. LINCOLN.

"Major-General McCLELLAN."

BATTLE OF MECHANICSVILLE.

On the afternoon of the 26th of June, between 2 and 3 o'clock, the enemy, in considerable force, made a vigorous attack upon the troops of Gen. McCall's Division, stationed at Mechanicsville, consisting of the two brigades of Seymour and Reynolds. The action lasted until midnight, when the enemy were repulsed. Troops were sent up by Gen. Porter to the assistance of those engaged; but they were not in the battle, though some of them were in position to support the right of the line.

About 12 o'clock that night the troops were ordered to fall back to Gaines's Mill, which was accomplished without loss.

BATTLE OF GAINES'S MILL.

On the 27th the battle of Gaines's Mill was fought, principally by the troops under Gen. Porter. Our forces there engaged were from 27,000 to 33,000; the force of the enemy being from two to three times that number. The enemy were in such superior force that, although our troops fought with exceeding bravery, they were driven back with a loss of about 9,000 men, in killed, wounded and missing.

Gen. McClellan was questioned as to the policy of leaving the right wing, consisting of only about 33,000 men, to meet the attack of the superior force of the enemy, instead of withdrawing it to the right bank of the Chickahominy before the battle of Gaines's Mill. His testimony on that point is as follows:

"Question. Whatever might have been the intentions of the enemy, as the attack was to have been made by him, would it not have been better to have placed both wings of our army on the same side of the Chickahominy prior to the battle of Gaines's Mill?

"Answer. I do not think they ought to have been brought to the same side of the river before they actually were."

"Question. What advantage was gained by leaving the right wing of our army to be attacked by a greatly superior force?"

"Answer. It prevented the enemy from getting on our flank and rear, and, in my opinion, enabled us to withdraw the army and its material."

"Question. Will you explain what was done by the right wing of our army at or about the time the left was engaged which saved our flank from attack and enabled the army and its material to be withdrawn?"

"Answer. By desperate fighting they inflicted so great a loss on the enemy as to check his movement on the left bank of the river, and gave us time to get our material out of the way."

RETREAT OF THE WHOLE ARMY DECIDED ON.

During the night after the battle of Gaines's Mill all our forces were concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy, and the next day the movement to the James River was determined upon. Gen. Heintzelman testifies that the night after that battle he was sent for by Gen. McClellan; that he found everything packed, ready to leave; that Gen. McClellan said there were two things to be done—to concentrate his forces and risk all on a battle, or to withdraw to the James River; that if he risked a battle there, and was beaten, the army was destroyed. Gen. Heintzelman advised him not to risk a battle under such circumstances, for if that army was lost the cause would be lost; that it were better to go to the James River and await re-enforcements. Gen. McClellan replied that he was of that opinion himself, and that was determined upon. That night, at 12:20 a. m., Gen. McClellan telegraphs the Secretary of War that he (Gen. McClellan) is not responsible for the result, but feels that the Government has not sustained his army.

To this the President replies, on the 28th:

"If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington he would have been upon us before the troops sent could have got to you."

"Save your army at all events. Will send re-enforcements as fast as we can. Of course they cannot reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next day."

The 28th of June passed without any serious fighting. Col. B. S. Alexander testifies that on the afternoon of that day he was sent for by Gen. McClellan, and went to his headquarters at Savage's Station, arriving there about dark. He received instructions to proceed with an escort to the James River, send back a sufficient number of men to act as guides for the different columns of the army, communicate with the gunboat, and order supplies to be brought up the river; to examine both shores of the James to the mouth of the Chickahominy, and ascertain the landing places; proceed up the Chickahominy to the head of navigation and ascertain the places where the army could cross, in case of necessity, and then return to headquarters and report. He left Savage's Station that night, and reached the James River the next afternoon. By the time he had completed his examination the army had reached the James River at Malvern.

M'CLELLAN PROPOSES TO DESTROY HIS BAGGAGE.

While at headquarters, receiving his instructions, he was shown, as he testifies, a printed order, not then issued, directing the destruction of the baggage of officers and men, and the tents, camps, equipage, and things of that kind; appealing to the army to submit to this privation, as it would be only temporary—"only for a few days." He remonstrated with Gen. McClellan against issuing such an order; that it would have a bad effect, would demoralize the army, as it would be telling them more plainly than they could be told in any other way that they were defeated and running for their lives. The order was not issued, and Gen. McClellan testifies that he has no recollection of any such order.

THE RETREAT TO JAMES RIVER.

The retreat to the James River having been decided upon, the army took up its march, being attacked by the enemy in the day time, and however successful in repelling those attacks, evacuating their positions during the night. The actions at

Savage's Station, Glendale and Malvern were fought during the movement of the army to the James, the enemy being repulsed in each day's fighting, and our army falling back, under orders, during the night.

It would appear, from all the information your Committee can obtain, that the battles were fought, the troops handled, new dispositions made and old ones changed, entirely by the corps commanders, without directions from the Commanding General. He would place the troops in the morning, then leave the field and seek the position for the next day, giving no directions until the close of the day's fighting, when the troops would be ordered to fall back during the night to the new position selected by him. In that manner the army reached the James River.

BATTLE OF MALVERN HILL.

The battle of Malvern Hill, of the 1st of July, was the most fiercely contested of any upon the peninsula. The troops were placed in the morning, under direction of Gen. McClellan, who then left the field, returning to it again in the afternoon. The first action of the day commenced about 10 o'clock in the forenoon, but did not continue long. The principal action, when the enemy attacked most vigorously and persistently, commenced late in the afternoon, and continued till after dark, the enemy being repulsed and beaten at every point. Many of the officers examined by your Committee are of the opinion that the enemy were so severely punished on that day that they could have been followed into Richmond had our army followed them up vigorously.

It is true that our army had been severely tried during the preceding week, fighting, as they did, nearly every day, and retreating every night. The corps commanders and the troops under them fought most bravely—no troops better. However disheartened they may have become by what all must have regarded as a precipitate retreat during the night, they still fought with the most obstinate bravery when attacked in the day time by an exultant and successful enemy.

M'CLELLAN STILL RETREATS.

The commanding general, however, determined to fall back from Malvern to Harrison's Bar, notwithstanding the victory won there by our army. He seems to have regarded his army as entirely unfitted to meet the enemy, for on the day of the battle at Malvern, evidently before that battle took place, he writes to the Adjutant-General of the army from Hazall's plantation.

AND STILL WANTS TROOPS.

"My men are completely exhausted, and I dread the result if we are attacked to-day by fresh troops. If possible, I shall retire to-night to Harrison's Bar, where the gunboats can render more aid in covering our position. Permit me to urge that not an hour should be lost in sending me fresh troops. More gunboats are much needed."

On the 2d of July the President telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"Your dispatch of yesterday morning induces me to hope your army is having some rest. In this hope allow me to reason with you for a moment. When you ask for 50,000 men to be promptly sent you, you must surely labor under some gross mistake of fact. Recently you sent papers showing your disposal of forces made last Spring for the defense of Washington, and advising a return to that plan. I find included in and about Washington 75,000 men. Now please be assured that I have not men enough to fill that very plan by 15,000. *All of Gen. Fremont's in the valley; all of Gen. Bank's; all of Gen. McDowell's not with you; and all in Washington, taken together do not exceed, if they reach, 60,000, with Gen. Wool and Gen. Dix added to those mentioned.* I have not outside of your army 75,000 men east of the mountains. Thus the idea of sending you 50,000 men, or any other considerable force, promptly, is simply absurd. If, in your frequent mention of responsibility, you had the impression that I blame you for including more than you can, please be relieved of such impression. I only beg that in like manner you will not ask impossibilities of me."

"If you think you are not strong enough to take Richmond just now, I do not ask you to try just now. Save the army, material and personnel, and I will strengthen it for the offensive again as fast I can."

On the 3d of July, after the army had reached

Harrison's Bar, Gen. McClellan writes to the Secretary of War:

"I am in hopes that the enemy is as completely worn out as we are; he was certainly very severely punished in the last battle. * * * It is, of course, impossible to estimate as yet our losses, but I doubt whether there are to-day more than 50,000 men with their colors."

"To accomplish the great task of capturing Richmond, and putting an end to this rebellion, re-enforcements should be sent me rather much over than less than 100,000 men."

THE ARMY HELPLESS.

The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrison's Bar was very precipitate. The troops, upon their arrival there, were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being collected within a space of about three miles along the river. *No orders were given the first day for occupying the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops so placed as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothing but a heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bringing up their artillery, saved the army there from destruction.* The enemy did succeed in bringing up some of their artillery, and threw some shells into the camp, before any preparations for defense had been made. On the 3d of July the heights were taken possession of by our troops and works of defense commenced, and then, and not until then, was our army secure in that position.

NUMBER OF TROOPS.

By reference to the testimony of Mr. Tucker, Assistant-Secretary of War, it will be seen that prior to the 5th of April, 1862, 121,500 men had been landed on the peninsula. Shortly afterward Gen. Franklin's division of Gen. McDowell's corps, numbering about 12,000 men, was sent down. In the early part of June Gen. McCall's division, of the same corps, of about 10,000 men, was sent down, together with about 11,000 men, from Baltimore and Fortress Monroe, and about the last of June, some 5,000 men of Gen. Shields's division were also sent down. Total, 159,500 men.

On the 20th of July, 1862, according to the returns sent to the Adjutant-General's office by Gen. McClellan, the Army of the Potomac, under his command, was as follows: Present for duty, 101,691; special duty, sick, and in arrest, 17,838; absent, 38,795; total, 158,314. This included the corps of Gen. Dix, amounting to 9,997, present for duty, or in all, 11,778 men.

M'CLELLAN IDLE.

The army remained at Harrison's Bar during the month of July and a part of August. It engaged in no active operations whatever, and was almost entirely unmolested by the enemy. The subject of the future operations of the army was a matter of much deliberation on the part of the Government. Gen. McClellan claimed that the James River was the true line of approach to Richmond, and that he should be re-enforced in order to renew the campaign against that place. The President visited the army about the 8th of July, but nothing was then decided upon.

HIS ARMY ENERVATED.

On the 25th of July Gen. Halleck visited the army at Harrison's Bar, accompanied by Gen. Burnside, who had come from North Carolina, with the greater portion of his force, to Fortress Monroe. The general officers were called together, and the question of withdrawing the army was submitted to them. The council was of rather an informal character. The majority of the officers expressed themselves in favor of a withdrawal of the army. Gen. Burnside testifies that, as he understood from the officers there, the army was not in a good condition, sickness was increasing, many of the regiments were without shelter and cooking utensils, and many of the men were without arms. The general opinion expressed by the leading officers was that the men had become very much enervated. *One of the leading officers said that his command could not, in his opinion, march three miles and fight a battle.* This condition

of the troops was one of the reasons assigned for the final withdrawal of the army from the peninsula.

M'CLELLAN'S DEMAND FOR RE-ENFORCEMENTS.

Gen. McClellan applied for 50,000 re-enforcements to enable him to resume active operations. Gen. Halleck, when he visited the army, informed Gen. McClellan that the Government could furnish him only 20,000 additional troops. Gen. McClellan consented to renew operations with that number of re-enforcements, and Gen. Halleck left with that understanding. But the day that he left Gen. McClellan wrote to him, asking for 15,000 or 20,000 troops from the Western army, in addition to those promised to him, urging very strongly that they should be brought here temporarily, to be returned to the West after Richmond should have been taken. As this could not be done, the order was given for the withdrawal of the army as rapidly as possible, in order to co-operate with the forces under Gen. Pope, then in the presence of a superior force of the enemy.

M'CLELLAN'S TESTIMONY.

In regard to the re-enforcement of the army while at Harrison's Landing, the testimony of Gen. McClellan is as follows:

"Question. How many available men did you estimate that you had at Harrison's Bar, and how many more would you have required in order to undertake a movement successfully upon Richmond?"

"Answer. I think I had about 85,000 or 90,000 men at Harrison's Bar, and would have undertaken another movement in advance with about 20,000 more re-enforcements. My view was that pretty much everything that the Government could have controlled ought to have been massed on the James River. I did not believe the enemy would trouble Washington so long as we had a powerful army in the vicinity of Richmond, and did not share the apprehensions for the safety of Washington that were entertained by a great many."

"I asked for 50,000 men at first, on the ground that I thought the army should be made as strong as possible, and as little as possible left to chance. When Gen. Halleck came down to Harrison's Bar, my recollection is that he said that 20,000 men, or something about that number, was all that could be had, and I said that I would try it again with that number. I have no recollection of having asked at a subsequent period for a greater number than 20,000 as a necessary preliminary to a movement."

"Question. About how many men had been lost from the 25th of June until you reached Harrison's Bar, in killed, wounded, and missing?"

"Answer. I think the loss was about 14,000; but I could not tell positively without looking at the returns."

"Question. Will you state in what your chances for success would have been greater, with the addition of 20,000 men to the number which you had at Harrison's Landing, than they were in front of Richmond, and before Jackson had formed a junction with the rest of the enemy's forces?"

"Answer. I should have counted upon the effect of the battles, which had just taken place, upon the enemy. We had then strong reasons to believe that the enemy's losses had been very much heavier than our own, and that portions of his army were very much demoralized, especially after the battle of Malvern Hill."

GEN. BARNARD'S REPORT.

In closing their report upon the campaign of the Peninsula, your Committee would refer to the report of Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief of Engineers of the Army of the Potomac during that campaign, made to Gen. McClellan. The conclusion of his report, which he terms "a retrospect pointing out the mistakes that were made, and thus tracing the causes of its (the Peninsular campaign's) failure to their true sources," is as follows:

CAUSES OF M'CLELLAN'S FAILURE.

"One of the prominent among the causes of ultimate failure was the inaction of eight months, from August, 1861, to April, 1862. More than any other wars, rebellion demands rapid measures. In November, 1861, the Army of the Potomac, if not fully supplied with all the 'materiel,' was yet about as complete in numbers, discipline, and organization as it ever became. For four months, the great marine avenue to the capital of the nation was blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial state of siege by a greatly inferior enemy, in face of a movable army of 150,000 men."

"In the Winter of 1861 and 1862, Norfolk could and should have been taken. The Navy demanded it, the country demanded it, and the means were ample. By its capture the career of the Merrimac,

which proved so disastrous to our subsequent operations, would have been prevented. The preparation of this vessel was known, and the Navy Department was not without forebodings of the mischief it would do.

"Though delay might mature more comprehensive plans and promise greater results, it is not the first case in which it has been shown that successful war involves something more than abstract military principles. The true question was to seize the first practicable moment to satisfy the, perhaps, unreasonable but natural longing of an ambitious nation for results to justify its lavish confidence, and to take advantage of an undivided command and untrammelled liberty of action while they were possessed.

"When the army did move, a plan was adopted perfectly certain to invite, nay, compel, interference, and when the army was to go by Annapolis to the lower Chesapeake, I felt confident that one-half would scarcely have been embarked before the other half would have been ordered back to Washington. The enemy was then at Manassas, and a feint, even if not reality, of an attack upon Washington was so obvious, so certain to create a panic, which no Executive could resist, that interference with the removal of the rest of the army was certain.

"When the enemy fell back behind the Rappahannock, and destroyed the railroad bridges, the circumstances were greatly changed, and there were strong arguments for the line adopted. Yet, results have proved how many reasons there were to be considered, beside the purely military ones, which opposed themselves to the adoption of such a line.

"The facts connected with the withholding of McDowell's corps have been so completely exhibited in the proceedings of the McDowell Court of Inquiry, that every one who wishes can form his own judgment. Whether it was wise or unwise, it was one of those things resulting from the taking of a line of operations which did not then cover Washington.

"At the time the Army of the Potomac landed on the Peninsula the Rebel army was at its lowest ebb. Its armies were demoralized by the defeats of Port Royal, Mill Spring, Port Henry, Fort Donelson, Roanoke Island, and Pea Ridge; and reduced by sickness, loss in battle, expirations of periods of service, &c.; while the Conscription law was not yet even passed, it seemed as if it needed but one vigorous grip to end forever this rebellion, so nearly throttled. Now, then, happened it that the day of the initiation of the campaign of this magnificent Army of the Potomac was the day of the resuscitation of the Rebel cause, which seemed to grow *pari passu* with the slow progress of its operations?

"However I may be committed to any expression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown should have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that they were not held in strong force when our army appeared before them; and we know that they were far from complete. The prestige of power, the *morale*, were on our side. It was due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should probably have succeeded. But if we had failed, it may well be doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would be more demoralizing than the labors of a siege.

"Our troops filled a month in the trenches, or lay in the swamps of Warwick. We lost few men by the siege, but disease took a fearful hold of the army, and toil and hardship, unredeemed by the excitement of combat, impaired their *morale*. We did not carry with us from Yorktown so good an army as we took there. Of the bitter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts' content. They are not yet exhausted.

"The siege having been determined upon, we should have opened our batteries on the place as fast as they were completed. Too effect on the troops would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege and shortened our labors; and, besides, we would have had the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms, whereas,

as it was, we only induced him to evacuate on prudential reasons.

"Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, it was right to pursue the enemy with our whole force. But the battle of Williamsburg, fought, as it was, without reconnoitering the position, without concert of action among the different corps and division commanders, and almost without orders, was a blunder which ought not to have happened.

"We knew of this position beforehand, and we knew it was fortified. We might have been sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it would be a strong one, for he would be fighting for time to get his trains out of our reach. We fought; we lost several thousand men, and we gained nothing. If we had not fought, the next day a battle would in all probability have been unnecessary. But if it had been necessary, we should have had time to have brought up our resources, reconnoitered the position, and delivered our attack in such a way that some result would have flowed from it.

"We had every advantage. Franklin's division landed at West Point on the next day, and Sedgwick's division on the day following. Those two divisions, had the enemy waited another day at Williamsburg, could have cut his communication, and in that case we would have been superior in his front and have had two divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat, and perhaps his capture, must inevitably have followed, and the great object of keeping Franklin so long embarked, and finally sending him to West Point, would have been accomplished.

"On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed the Chickahominy, and connected with the navy in the James River. We should then have had a united army, and the coöperation of the navy, and probably would have been in Richmond in two weeks. The fact that we did not know the character of the Chickahominy as an obstacle (as it lay across our direct road to Richmond), that our transports were on the York River, and that the railroad furnished a good means of supply to the army, that we wished to connect with McDowell coming from Fredericksburg, &c., determined our route. In taking it we lost essentially all that was worth going so far to gain, viz: the James River approach and the coöperation of the navy.

"The route chosen, two weeks should not have been spent in traversing the forty miles from Williamsburg to Bottom's and New Bridges; and the barrier of the Chickahominy being left unguarded at Bottom's Bridge, no time should have been lost in making use of the circumstance to turn and seize the passage of New Bridge, which might have been done by the 23^d of May, and even earlier, had measures been pressed and prepared for it.

"The repulse of the rebels at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. It was one of those occasions which, if not seized, do not repeat themselves. We now know the state of disorganization and dismay in which the Rebel army retreated. We now know that it could have been followed into Richmond. Had it been so, there would have been no resistance to overcome to bring over our right wing. Although we did not then know all that we now do, it was obvious at that time that when the Rebels struck the blow at our left wing, they did not leave any means in their hands unused to secure success. It was obvious enough that they struck with their whole force, and yet we repulsed them in disorder with three-fifths of ours. We should have followed them up at the same time that we brought over the other two-fifths.

"After it was known that McDowell was called off to another quarter, there was no longer hope of an increase of force by the junction of his corps. There were no other re-enforcements to look for beyond what we received by the middle of the month of June. The Rebel force was known or supposed to be constantly increasing by conscription, by the influx of troops from other parts, and by the breaking up of Beauregard's army.

"At last the moment came when action was im-

perative. The enemy assumed the initiative. We had warning of when and where he was to strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night of the 26th of June, our army would have been concentrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy River, while two corps, at least, of the enemy's force were on the left bank. Whatever course we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and the portion of the enemy on the right bank, or move at once for the James, we would have had a concentrated army and a fair chance of a brilliant result in the first; and in the second, if we accomplished nothing, we would have been in the same case on the morning of the 27th as we were on that of the 28th, minus a lost battle and a compulsory retreat. Or had the fortified lines, thrown up expressly for that object, been held by 20,000 men, as they could have been, we would have fought on the other side with 80,000 men instead of 27,000. Or, finally, had the lines been abandoned, with our hold on the right bank of the Chickahominy, we might have fought and crushed the enemy on the left bank, reopened our communication, and then returned and taken Richmond.

"As it was, the enemy fought with his whole force—except enough left before our lines to keep up an appearance—and we fought with 27,000 men, losing a battle and 9,000 men. By this defeat we were driven from our position, our advance for conquest turned into a retreat for safety by a force probably not greatly superior to our own.

"In view of the length of time which our operations before Richmond consumed, there is now no doubt that the depot at the White House should have been fortified, as well as one or two points on the railroad thence to the Chickahominy; that the *tête-de-pont* at Bottom's Bridge should have been completed, and likewise *têtes-de-pont*, or strong positions, prepared to cover the *debouchés* from our bridges to the left bank of the Chickahominy. With these the army would have possessed freedom of motion to concentrate on either side, and the disastrous battle of the 27th would scarcely have occurred.

"When the army reached the James River it needed no prophet to predict the disasters which have since befallen our country's cause. If the army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be denied that so much fruitless toil, and so much disaster, had deprived it of the *elan* which results from successive wins. It was, moreover, as well as our forces elsewhere, sadly diminished in numbers. On the other hand, the whole army, from its first low state, had risen up an army most formidable in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired by a great success. Had its number, indeed, approached to that attributed to it—200,000 men—there is little doubt that a march upon Washington would have speedily followed our withdrawal to the James.

"From such considerations, as well as those following from the results of the past operations, I counseled the immediate withdrawal from the James to reunite with our forces covering Washington."

The report of Gen. Barnard is the only report of the officers engaged in the campaign of the Peninsula which your Committee have obtained. Two report by the commanding general has not yet been made, and the reports of his subordinates have not been sent by him to the Department.

CO-OPERATION WITH GEN. POPE.

Gen. Burnside, with his command, was the first to leave the peninsula. He landed at Aquia and proceeded to Fredericksburg, relieving Gen. King, who proceeded at once to rejoin his corps (McDowell's) then with Gen. Pope. Soon after, Gen. Burnside was ordered to send all possible assistance to Gen. Pope, and at once ordered two of his three divisions (Reno's and Stevens's) up the Rappahannock. Shortly after that the advance of the army of the Potomac, Fitz John Porter's corps, reached Aquia, and was sent forward by Gen. Burnside to Gen. Pope. The rest of the Army of the Potomac,

except Keyes's corps, left to garrison Yorktown, proceeded to Alexandria, and from there joined Gen. Pope. Gen. Sumner stopped at Aquia and embarked a portion of his corps there; but he received orders to re-embark them again and proceed to Alexandria, which he did.

The troops sent to the assistance of Gen. Pope were sent by orders of Gen. Halleck; for those sent from Aquia the orders were given through Gen. Burnside; for those sent out from Alexandria, the orders were given directly to the corps commanders, until Gen. McClellan arrived, on the 25th of August; after which the orders were given through him.

The circumstances connected with the campaign of the Army of Virginia have been so fully investigated by the military courts in the cases of Gen. McDowell and Gen. Fitz John Porter, the proceedings of which were public, that your Committee have not deemed it necessary to make so thorough an investigation of that campaign as they would otherwise have done. They refer, therefore, principally to the orders and correspondence, in relation to the delays in the forwarding of Gen. Sumner's and Gen. Franklin's corps from Alexandria to the assistance of Gen. Pope.

McCLELLAN'S DELAYS IN SENDING ASSISTANCE.

At 10 a. m., Aug. 27, Gen. Halleck telegraphs Gen. McClellan that

"Franklin's corps should march in that direction (Manassas) as soon as possible."

At 10:40 a. m. Gen. McClellan replies:

"I have sent orders to Franklin to prepare to march with his corps at once, and to repair here (Alexandria) in person to inform him as to his means of transportation. Kearney was yesterday at Rappahannock; Porter at Bealton, Kelly's, Burdett's, &c. Sumner will commence reaching Falmouth to-day."

At 12 m. on the same day Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"Telegrams from Gen. Porter to Gen. Burnside, just received, say that Banks is at Fayetteville. McDowell, Sigel, and Ricketts, near Warrenton; Reno on his right. Porter is marching on Warrenton to re-enforce Pope. Nothing said of Hentzelman. Porter reports a general battle imminent. Franklin's corps should move out by forced marches, carrying three or four days' provisions, to be supplied, as far as possible, by railroad."

From Gen. McClellan to Gen. Halleck, same day, sent 12:45 p. m., received 1:40 p. m.:

"My aid has just returned from Gen. Franklin's camp. Reports that Gen. Franklin, Smith, and Stevens, are all in Washington. He gave the order to the next in rank to place the corps in readiness to move at once."

From same to same, sent 1:15 p. m., received 1:50 p. m.

"Franklin's artillery has no horses, except for four guns without caissons. I can pick up no cavalry. In view of these facts, will it not be well to push Sumner's corps here by water as rapidly as possible, to make immediate arrangements for placing the works in front of Washington in an efficient condition of defense. I have no means of knowing the enemy's force between Pope and ourselves. Can Franklin, without his artillery or cavalry, effect any useful purpose in front? Should not Burnside at once take steps to evacuate Falmouth and Aquia, at the same time covering the retreat of all of Pope's troops who may fall back in that direction? I do not see that we have force enough on hand to form a connection with Pope, whose exact position we do not know. Are we to send the direction of the valley?"

At 1:50 p. m. Gen. Halleck replies:

"Yes; I think Sumner's corps should come to Alexandria. The enemy has appeared at Leesburg, and the commanding officer at Edwards Ferry asks for cavalry. Have you any to spare him? The enemy seems to be trying to turn Pope's right. Is there no way of communicating with him?"

On the morning of the 23th of August, Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. Franklin:

"On putting with Gen. McClellan, about two o'clock this morning, it was understood that you were to move with your corps to-day toward Manassas Junction, to drive the enemy from the railroad. I have just learned that the General has not returned to Alexandria. If you have not received his order, act on this."

At 1:05 p. m. of the same day, the 23th, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck:

"Your dispatch to Franklin received. I have been doing all possible to hurry artillery and cavalry. The moment Franklin can be started with a reasonable amount of artillery

he shall go. * * * * * Please see Barnard, and be sure the works toward Chain Bridge are perfectly secure. I look upon these works, especially Ethan Allen and Nancy, as of the first importance."

At 3:30 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"Not a moment must be lost in pushing as large a force as possible toward Manassas, so as to communicate with Pope before the enemy is re-enforced."

At 4:45 p. m. Gen. McClellan replies:

"Your dispatch received. Neither Franklin's nor Sumner's corps is now in condition to move and fight a battle. It would be a sacrifice to send them out now. I have sent aides to ascertain the condition of the commands of Cox and Tyler, but I still think that a premature movement in small force will accomplish nothing but the destruction of the troops sent out. I repeat that I will lose no time in preparing the troops now here for the field, and that whatever orders you may give, after hearing what I have to say, will be carried out."

At 8:40 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"There must be no further delay in moving Franklin's corps toward Manassas; they must go to-morrow morning, ready or not ready. If we delay too long to get ready there will be no necessity to go at all, for Pope will either be defeated or victorious without our aid. If there is a want of wagons, the men must carry provisions with them till the wagons can come to their relief."

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Your dispatch received. Franklin's corps has been ordered to march at 6 o'clock to-morrow morning. Sumner has about 14,000 infantry, without cavalry or artillery here."

At 10:30 a. m. of the 29th, Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck:

"Franklin's corps is in motion; started about 6 a. m. I can give him but two squadrons of cavalry. * * * * * If Sumner moves in support of Franklin, it leaves us without any trustworthy troops in and near Washington. Yet Franklin is too much alone. What shall be done? Have but three squadrons belonging to the Army of the Potomac. Franklin has but forty rounds of ammunition, and no wagons to move more. I do not think Franklin is in condition to accomplish much if he meets strong resistance. I should not have moved him but for your pressing orders of last night."

At 12 m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Do you wish the movement of Franklin's corps to continue? He is without reserve ammunition and without transportation."

In another dispatch of same date he telegraphs:

"Franklin has only between 10,000 and 11,000 ready for duty. How far do you wish this force to advance?"

At 3 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"I want Franklin's corps to go far enough to find out something about the enemy. Perhaps he may get such information at Annapolis as to prevent his going further; otherwise he will push on toward Fairfax. Try to get something from direction of Manassas, either by telegram or through Franklin's scouts. Our people must move more actively, and find out where the enemy is. I am tired of guesses."

At 2:40 p. m. the President asks of Gen. McClellan:

"What news from direction of Manassas Junction? What, generally?"

At 2:45 p. m., received 3:30 p. m., Gen. McClellan replies:

"The last news received from the direction of Manassas was from stragglers, to the effect that the enemy were evacuating Centreville and retiring toward Thoroughfare Gap. This is by no means reliable. I am clear that one of two courses should be adopted: First, To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope. Second, To leave Pope to get out of his scrape, and at once use all means to make the capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer. Tell me what you wish me to do, and I will do all in my power to accomplish it. I wish to know what my orders and authority are. I ask for nothing, but will obey whatever orders you give. I only ask for a prompt decision, that I may at once give the necessary orders. It will not do to delay longer."

At 4:10 p. m. the President replies:

"Yours of to-day just received. I think your first alternative, to wit: 'to concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope,' is the right one. But I wish not to control. That I now leave to Gen. Halleck, aided by your counsels."

FRANKLIN'S DISOBEDIENCE.

At 7:50 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"You will immediately send construction train and guards to repair railroad to Manassas. Let there be no delay in this. I have just been told that Franklin's corps stopped at Annapolis, and that he was this evening in Alexandria. This is all contrary to my orders. Investigate and report the fact of this disobedience. That corps must push forward, as I directed, to protect the railroad and open our communications with Manassas."

M'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR IT.

To this Gen. McClellan replies, at 8 p. m., received 8:50 p. m.:

"It was not asafe for Franklin to move beyond Annapolis, under the circumstances, until we knew what was at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here until about 1 p. m., endeavoring to arrange for supplies for his command. I am responsible for both these circumstances, and do not see that either was in disobedience to your orders. Please give distinct orders in reference to Franklin's movements of to-morrow. * * * * * In regard to to-morrow's movements I desire definite instructions, as it is not agreeable to me to be accused of disobeying orders, when I have simply exercised the discretion you committed to me."

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Not hearing from you, I have sent orders to Gen. Franklin to place himself in communication with Gen. Pope, by advancing as soon as possible, and at the same time cover the transit of Pope's supplies."

At 10 p. m. Gen. McClellan forwards to Gen. Halleck a dispatch received from Gen. Franklin at Annapolis, dated 7:15 p. m., in which Gen. Franklin gives rumors concerning the battle of that day, closing thus:

"Pope is said to be very short of provisions, and the country will not support him."

At 5 a. m. of the 30th of August Gen. Pope sent a dispatch to Gen. Halleck, received at 3:30 p. m., from battle-field near Groveton, Virginia, containing an account of the battle of the day before, and closing as follows:

M'CLELLAN REFUSES SUPPLIES TO POPE.

"I think you had best send Franklin's, Cox's, and Sturgis's regiments to Centreville, as also forage and subsistence. I received a note this morning from Gen. Franklin, written by order of Gen. McClellan, saying that wagons and cars would be loaded and sent to Fairfax Station as soon as I would send a cavalry escort to Alexandria to bring them out. Such a request, when Alexandria is full of troops and we fighting the enemy, needs no comment. Will you have these supplies sent, without the least delay, to Centreville?"

At 9:40 a. m., August 30, Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"I am by no means satisfied with Gen. Franklin's march of yesterday, considering the circumstances of the case. He was very wrong in stopping at Annapolis. Moreover, I learned last night that the Quartermaster's Department could have given him plenty of transportation, if he had applied for it, any time since his arrival at Alexandria. He knew the importance of opening communication with Gen. Pope's army, and should have acted more promptly."

At 11 a. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"Have ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to move the rest, via Columbia Pike, on Annapolis and Fairfax Court-House, if this is the route you wish them to take. He and Franklin are both instructed to join Pope as promptly as possible. Shall Couch move also when he arrives?"

At 12:20 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs:

"I think Couch should land at Alexandria, and be immediately pushed out to Pope. Send the troops where the fighting is. Let me know when Couch arrives, as I may have other information by that time. * * * Send transports to Aquia to bring up the inside's command. I have telegraphed to him, and am awaiting his answer."

At 2:15 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs:

"Franklin's and all of Sumner's corps should be pushed forward with all possible dispatch. They must use their legs and make forced marches. Time now is everything."

At 5 p. m. Gen. McClellan telegraphs to Gen. Halleck:

"Major Hammerstein of my staff reports, from two miles this side of Centreville, at 1:30 p. m., that Franklin's corps was then advancing rapidly. Sumner's corps moved at 1:45 p. m. The orderly who brought the dispatch from Hammerstein states that he learned that the fighting commenced five miles beyond Centreville, and that our people had been driving them all day. Hammerstein says all he learns was favorable."

At 10:10 p. m. Gen. Halleck telegraphs to Gen. McClellan:

"All of Sumner's Corps on the south side of the river, not actually required in the forts, should march to Pope's relief."

Replace them with new regiments. Franklin should also be hurried on to reinforce Pope."

On the same day—Aug. 30, hour not given—Gen. McClellan sent the following to Gen. Halleck.

"Ever since Gen. Franklin received notice that he was to march from Alexandria, he has been using every effort to get transportation for his extra ammunition. But he was uniformly told by the Quartermasters here that there was none disposable, and his command marched without wagons. After the departure of his corps, at 6 a. m. yesterday, he procured 20 wagons to carry a portion of his ammunition, by unloading some of Gen. Banks's supply train for that purpose.

"Gen. Sumner was one entire day in endeavoring, by application upon Quartermasters and others, to get a sufficient number of wagons to transport his reserve ammunition, but without success, and was obliged to march without it. "I have this morning sent all my headquarters train that is landed to be at once loaded with ammunition for Sumner and Franklin, but they will not go far toward supplying the deficiency.

"Eighty-five wagons were got together by the Quartermaster last night, loaded with subsistence, and sent forward under an escort at 1 a. m., via Alexandria.

"Every effort has been made to carry out your instructions promptly. The difficulty seems to consist in the fact that the water part of the transportation on hand at Alexandria and Washington has been needed for current supplies of the garrisons. At all events, such is the state of the case as represented to me by the Quartermaster, and it appears to be true. I take it for granted that this has not been properly explained to you."

At 10:45 a. m. of the 31st of August, Gen. Pope sends the following to Gen. Halleck from Centreville:

"Our troops are all here, and in position, though much used up and worn out. I think it would, perhaps, have been better if Sumner and Franklin had been here some or four days ago. But you may rely upon my giving them (the enemy) as desperate a fight as I can force our men to stand up to. I should like to know whether you feel secure about Washington, should this army be destroyed. I shall fight it as long as a man will stand up to the work. You must judge what is to be done, having in view the safety of the capital. The enemy is already pushing a cavalry reconnaissance in our front at Cub Run, whether in advance of an attack to-day I do not yet know. I send you this that you may know our position and my purpose."

On the 2d of September Gen. Pope was ordered to fall back to the vicinity of Washington, where his army came under the command of Gen. McClellan.

MC'CLELLAN RESPONSIBLE FOR POPE'S DEFEAT.

The following is from the testimony of Gen. Halleck:

"Question. Had the Army of the Peninsula been brought to co-operate with the Army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circumstances would have permitted, in your judgment, as a military man, would it not have resulted in our victory instead of our defeat?

"Answer. I thought so at the time, and still think so."

In relation to the command of Gen. McClellan, he himself testifies as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of Gen. Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time—one or two days, two or three days, perhaps—without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck to take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under Gen. Pope. I think it was on the next day after that I was instructed verbally by the President and Gen. Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position that I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly."

The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon the same point is as follows:

"Question. What was the position of Gen. McClellan in regard to the troops of the Army of the Potomac as they landed at Aquia Creek and Alexandria? Were they under his command; and if so, how long did they remain under his command?

"Answer. Gen. McClellan retained the command of the Army of the Potomac as it landed at those two points, except such portions of it as were sent into the field under Gen. Pope. Those portions were considered temporarily detached from his command, but still belonging to his army, and he was directed that all orders sent from him to the troops as detached, while under Gen. Pope's immediate command, must be sent through the headquarters at Washington. He retained command of all the troops of his army as they landed at those places until sent into the field, and reported to Gen. Pope; and they continued to remain under his command, with the exception of his detachments, until Gen. Pope's army fell back on Washington, when all came under Gen. McClellan's command. On his

(Gen. McClellan's) arrival at Alexandria he was told to take immediate command of all the troops in and about Washington, in addition to those which properly belonged to the Army of the Potomac. Some days after he had been verbally directed to take such command he asked for a formal order, which was issued from the Adjutant-General's office. The order issued from the Adjutant-General's office was after Gen. Pope's army commenced falling back, and was dated Sept. 2; but Gen. McClellan had been in command ever since his arrival at Alexandria.

"Question. At what time did he arrive in Alexandria?

"Answer. He arrived at Alexandria on the 26th of August. The formal order was issued that he might have no difficulty with Gen. Pope's forces; that they might not question his authority."

THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.

Very soon after Gen. Pope and his army fell back on Washington the Rebel army entered Maryland. Preparations were immediately made by the authorities in Washington to follow them.

In relation to the command of the army in Maryland your Committee will quote from the testimony of Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck. The testimony of Gen. McClellan is as follows:

"Question. What position did you occupy after your arrival at Alexandria, and you had forwarded the troops which had been under your command to the assistance of Gen. Pope?

"Answer. I was for some little time—one or two days, two or three days, perhaps—without any position; merely at my camp, without any command. On Monday, the 1st of September, I received verbal instructions from Gen. Halleck to take command of the defenses of Washington. I was, however, expressly prohibited from, in any way, assuming any control over the troops under Gen. Pope. I think it was on the next day after that that I was instructed verbally by the President and Gen. Halleck to go out and meet the army which was coming in, and to assume command of it when it approached the position which I considered it ought to occupy for defensive purposes, and to post it properly."

MC'CLELLAN FORGETS.

"Question. How long did you remain in command of the defenses of Washington, and what orders did you next receive, and from whom?

"Answer. I do not think that order, assigning the defenses of Washington, was ever rescinded, or any other one issued in its place. I had only verbal communications with Gen. Halleck before I started on the Antietam campaign. And it was never definitely decided, up to the time that I left, as to whether I was to go or not. I asked the question two or three times of Gen. Halleck, whether I was to command the troops in the field, and he said it had not been determined. And I do not think that it ever was. I think that was one of those things that grew into shape itself. When the time came I went out."

The following is the testimony of Gen. Halleck upon that point:

"Question. By whose orders was Gen. McClellan placed in command of the army that left Washington to operate in Maryland; and were these orders verbal or in writing?

"Answer. As I stated the other day, the order was given verbally to Gen. McClellan by the President, at Gen. McClellan's house, about 1 o'clock in the morning, previous to Gen. McClellan leaving the city for Rockville.

"I will add that Gen. McClellan, in virtue of his being placed in command of the fortifications of Washington and the troops for defense within them, was really in command of all the troops here at that time. The question was discussed by the President for two or three days as to who should take command of the troops that were to go into the field. The decision was made by himself, and announced to Gen. McClellan in my presence. I did not know what the decision was until I heard it thus announced."

MC'CLELLAN FORGETS AGAIN.

In regard to the instructions given to Gen. McClellan his testimony is as follows:

"Question. Did you have any interview with the President in relation to taking command of the troops for the Maryland campaign, or receive any instructions from him on that point?

"Answer. I do not think he gave me any instructions after that morning, when I was told to take command of the army in front of Washington. I do not think he gave me any instructions about the Maryland campaign.

"After you commenced the movement, did you receive any instructions from any one?

"Answer. I received some telegrams, that might be looked upon in the nature of instructions, from Gen. Halleck and from the President. The general tenor of Halleck's dispatches was that I was committing an error in going so far away from Washington; that I was going rather too fast. He had the impression that the main force of the enemy was on the south side of the Potomac, and that they had only a small force in front of me to draw me on, and then they would come into Washington in rear. As late as the 13th of September, I received a telegram from Gen. Halleck in which he pressed that same idea, and told me that I was wrong in going so far away."

The testimony of Gen. Halleck upon that point is as follows:

"Question. What instructions, if any, were given to Gen. McClellan in regard to the conduct of the campaign in Maryland?

"Answer. The day the President gave Gen. McClellan directions to take command of the forces in the field, we had a long conversation in regard to the campaign in Maryland. It was agreed between us that the troops should move up the Potomac, and, if possible, a general attack on Gen. Lee's army which had crossed the Potomac from the remainder of the Virginia side. There were no definite instructions, further than that under standing between us, as to the general plan of the campaign.

"I submitted herewith copies of dispatches to and from Gen. McClellan, after he left Washington to take command of operations in Maryland, to the time that he was relieved from command. The papers comprise all the dispatches sent to and received from Gen. McClellan, so far as I know, except a letter dated October 13, addressed to him by the President, and which was shown to me just as the President was about to dispatch it to Gen. McClellan, and Gen. McClellan's reply, dated October 17. [The letter of the President, with the reply of Gen. McClellan, is incorporated in another part of this report.]

"I read to Gen. McClellan's going too fast or too far from Washington, there can be found no such telegram from him. I do not mistake the meaning of the telegram I sent him. I telegraphed him that he was going too far, not from Washington, but from the Potomac, leaving Gen. Lee the opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between him and Washington. I thought Gen. McClellan should keep more upon the Potomac, and press forward his left rather than his right, to move more readily to relieve Harper's Ferry, which was the point then in most immediate danger; that he was pushing forward his right too fast relatively to the movements of his left—not that the army was moving too fast or too far from Washington."

The letter of Gen. Halleck of Sept. 13, referred to by Gen. McClellan, is as follows:

"Sent 10:45 a. m.

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 13, 1862."

"MAJOR-GEN. MCCLELLAN: Yours of 9:30 p. m., yesterday, is just received. Gen. Banks cannot safely send eight new regiments from here. You must remember that very few troops are now received from the North, nearly all being stopped to guard the railroad. Four regiments were ordered to Gen. Dix to replace Peck's division. Porter took away yesterday over 23,000. Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. I am of opinion that the enemy will send a small column to Pennsylvania, so as to draw your forces in that direction; then suddenly move on Washington with the forces south of the Potomac, and those he may cross over."

"In your letter of the 11th you attach too little importance to the capital. I assure you that you are wrong. The capture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us. Beware of the evils I now point out to you. You saw them when here, but you seem to forget them in the distance. No more troops can be sent from here till we have fresh arrivals from the North."

MCCLELLAN PROPOSES TO SACRIFICE WASHINGTON.

The letter from Gen. McClellan, of the 11th, to which Gen. Halleck here refers, contains the following:

"I believe this army fully appreciates the importance of a victory at this time, and will fight well; but the result of a general battle, with such odds as the enemy now appears to have against us, might, to say the least, be doubtful; and, if we should be defeated, the consequences to the country would be disastrous in the extreme. Under these circumstances, I would recommend that one or two of the three army corps now on the Potomac, opposite Washington, be at once withdrawn, and sent to reinforce this army. I would also advise that the force of Col. Miles at Harper's Ferry, where it can be of little use, and is continually exposed to be cut off by the enemy, be immediately ordered here. This would add about 23,000 old troops to our present force, and would greatly strengthen us."

"If there are any Rebel forces remaining on the other side of the Potomac, they must be so few that the troops left in the fort, after the two corps shall have been withdrawn, will be sufficient to check them, and will be the large cavalry force now on this side, kept well out in front to give warning of the distant approach of any very large army; a part of this army might be sent back within the Intrenchments to assist in repelling an attack. Let even if Washington should be taken while the armies are confronting each other, this would not, in my judgment, bear comparison with the ruin and disasters which would follow a single defeat of this army. If we should be successful in conquering the gigantic Rebel army before us, we would have no difficulty in recouping it. On the other hand, should their force prove sufficiently powerful to defeat us, could all the forces now around Washington be sufficient to prevent such a victorious army from carrying the works on this side of the Potomac after they are uncovered by our army? I think not."

Your Committee having gone so fully into the details of the Peninsula campaign, do not deem it necessary to devote so much space to the campaign in Maryland. The same mind that controlled the movements upon the Peninsula controlled those in Maryland, and the same general features characterize the one campaign that characterized the other. In each may be seen the same unreadiness to move promptly and act vigorously; the same desire for more troops before advancing; and the same references to the great superiority of numbers on the part of the enemy. Your Committee, therefore, content themselves with referring briefly to the leading operations of the campaign.

HARPER'S FERRY.

In relation to the surrender of Harper's Ferry, your Committee have not deemed it necessary to take much testimony upon that subject. The military commission which was convened in this city in October last fully investigated that subject, and their report has been given to the public. Attention is called merely to two telegrams of Sept. 11, which passed between Gen. McClellan and Gen. Halleck, and which are as follows:

"ROCKVILLE, Sept. 11—9:45 a. m.

"Col. Miles is at or near Harper's Ferry, I understand, with 9,000 troops. He can do nothing where he is, but could be of great service if ordered to join me. I suggest that he be ordered at once to join me by the most practicable route."

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

"Major-General Commanding."

"Major-Gen. H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief."

"WAR DEPARTMENT."

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Sept. 11, 1862—Sent 2:20 p. m."

"There is no way for Col. Miles to join you at present. The only chance is to defend his works until you can open a communication with him. When you do so, he will be subject to your orders."

"H. W. HALLECK,

"General-in-Chief."

"Major-Gen. McClellan, Rockville."

SOUTH MOUNTAIN.

On the 14th of September the battle of South Mountain was fought—the troops at Turner's Gap being under command of Gen. Burnside, and those at Crampton's Gap being under the command of Gen. Franklin—resulting in the enemy retiring to the vicinity of Shepherdstown.

ANTIETAM.

On the 17th of September the battle of Antietam was fought. It was commenced by Gen. Hooker on the right, at dawn, our troops driving the enemy before them, and gaining an important position. When Gen. Hooker was wounded and taken from the field, Gen. Sumner took command of our right. Gen. Sumner had been ordered to hold his corps in readiness to advance an hour before daylight, but did not receive the order to advance until 7:20 in the morning. Gen. Mansfield, who had come up to the support of Gen. Hooker, had been killed. Our troops, seeing their leaders fall, and being very heavily pressed by the enemy, were forced back for some distance from the advanced position Gen. Hooker had reached; but finally, with the assistance of the troops brought up by Gen. Sumner, checked the enemy's progress and maintained their position.

On the left, Gen. Burnside, about 10 o'clock, was ordered to attack the enemy at the bridge across the Antietam in his front, and to effect a crossing there. The advance of Gen. Burnside was met by a most obstinate resistance on the part of the enemy, and it was not until 1½ o'clock that the bridge was carried. By 3 o'clock Gen. Burnside's whole command had crossed and taken position on some elevated ground just above the bridge. He was then ordered to take the heights commanding the town of Shepherdstown, which was done after desperate fighting. By that time the enemy on our left had been re-enforced by withdrawing some of their troops from opposite our right, where our advance had been checked, and Gen. Burnside was compelled to give up some of the ground he had succeeded in occupying. He had sent to Gen. McClellan for re-enforcements, but received in reply that there were none to be had, but he must hold the bridge at all hazards.

The corps of Gen. Fitz John Porter, in the center, was not brought into action at all. Gen. Hooker testifies that he had been given to understand that there were to be attacks made simultaneously on the right, center, and left of our army. He attacked at dawn; but Gen. Burnside on the left was not ordered to attack until 10 o'clock, and there was no attack made in the center by Gen. Porter.

MCLELLAN ATTACKS BY DRIBLETS.

In regard to the manner of conducting the attack at Antietam, Gen. Sumner testifies:

"I have always believed that instead of sending these troops into that action in dribbles as they were sent, if Gen. McClellan had authorized me to march these 40,000 men on the left flank of the enemy, we could not have failed to throw them right back in front of the other divisions of our army on our left—Burnside's, Franklin's, and Porter's corps. As it was, we went in, division after division, until even one of my own divisions was forced out. The other two drove the enemy and held their position. My intention at the time was to have proceeded entirely on by their left and move down, bringing them right in front of Burnside, Franklin and Porter.

"Question. And all escape for the enemy would have been impossible?"

"Answer. I think so."

The battle closed at dark, our army having gained some little advantages, at a heavy loss, but nothing decisive. The attack was not renewed the next day, the two armies occupying the positions held by them at the close of the yesterday's battle.

WHY THE ATTACK WAS NOT RENEWED.

In relation to the policy of renewing the attack on the day after the battle, Gen. McClellan testifies:

"The next morning (the 13th) I found that our loss had been so great, and that we were so much disorganized in some of the commands, that I did not consider it proper to renew the attack that day, especially as I was sure of the arrival that day of two fresh divisions, amounting to about 15,000 men. As an instance of the condition of some of the troops that morning, I happened to recollect the returns of the First Corps—Gen. Hooker's—made the morning of the 13th, by which time there were about 8,000 men reported present for duty. Four days after that the returns of the same corps showed 13,500.

THE REBELS BLUDE MCLELLAN.

"I had arranged, however, to renew the attack at daybreak on the 14th, but I learned some time during the night or early in the morning, that the enemy had abandoned his position. It was not proved that he moved with great rapidity, and, not being incumbered by wagons, was enabled to get his troops across the river before we could do him any serious injury. I think that, taking into consideration what the troops had gone through, we got as much out of them in this Antietam campaign as human endurance would bear."

WHAT BURNSIDE THOUGHT.

The testimony of Gen. Burnside, on the subject of renewing the attack upon the enemy the day after the battle, is as follows:

"Question. Did you express any opinion to Gen. McClellan, or to any one at headquarters, in relation to renewing the attack the next day; and if so, what opinion did you express?"

"Answer. I did express an opinion to Gen. McClellan on the subject. After my command was in position—say 24 o'clock or right—I went over to Gen. McClellan's headquarters at Gadsbyville, and expressed the opinion to Gen. Marcy, his chief of staff, that the attack ought to be renewed the next morning at 5 o'clock. I also expressed the same opinion to other members of Gen. McClellan's staff. Gen. Marcy told me that I ought to see Gen. Morell and tell him what I thought of the matter. I went into Gen. McClellan's tent, and in the course of the conversation I expressed the same opinion to him, and told him that if I could have 5,000 fresh troops to pass in advance of mine I would be willing to command the attack on the next morning. He said that he had been thinking the matter over and would make up his mind during the night, and if I would send a staff officer to his headquarters, to remain there over night, he would send me orders early in the morning; and if he concluded to renew the attack, he would send me the necessary men. I did send the staff officer over, but Gen. McClellan concluded not to renew the attack the next day.

"Question. Would there have been any difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops which you desired, as the corps of Gen. Fitz John Porter, some 15,000 or 20,000 men, had not been engaged?"

"Answer. There would have been no difficulty in furnishing the 5,000 fresh troops. In fact, Gen. McClellan did send Gen. Morell's division, of quite that strength, to report to me, but not with orders to me to renew the attack."

FRANKLIN'S OPINION.

Gen. Franklin testifies:

"Question. Were you consulted in relation to renewing the attack the next day?"

"Answer. When Gen. McClellan visited the right in the afternoon, I showed him a position on the right of the wood I had already mentioned, in which was the Dunker Church, which I thought commanded the wood, and that if it could be taken, we could drive the enemy from the wood by merely holding this point. I advised that we should make the attack on that place the next morning, from Gen. Sumner's position. I thought there was no doubt about our being able to carry it. We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it. We drove the enemy from there that afternoon, and I had no doubt that we could take that place the next morning, and I thought that would uncover the whole left of the enemy.

"Question. If that had been made, and that point had been carried, what would have been the effect upon the enemy?"

"Answer. It would have been very disastrous to them."

"Question. What reasons were given for not making the attack the next morning?"

"Answer. I did not hear the direct reason of the General Commanding, but I have understood that the reason was, that he expected some fifteen thousand new troops, whose arrival would make the thing a certain thing—and he preferred to wait to make this attack on the right, until these new troops came."

"Question. And that delay gave the enemy an opportunity to escape?"

"Answer. I think it did."

On the night of the 18th of September the enemy abandoned their position and retired across the Potomac into Virginia, without molestation. Our army slowly followed, and took up a position along the Potomac, on the Maryland side, occupying Maryland Heights on the 20th, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d.

LOSSES ON BOTH SIDES.

Gen. McClellan, on the 23d of September, reports our losses at South Mountain at 2,335; at Antietam, 12,493—total losses in both battles, 14,794. In relation to the losses of the enemy in both those battles, in killed, wounded, prisoners and stragglers, Gen. McClellan says:

"It may be safely concluded, therefore, that the Rebel army lost at least 30,000 of their best troops in their brief campaign in Maryland."

MCLELLAN WANTS MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS.

After the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan called for re-enforcements, and announced his determination to fortify Maryland Heights, making a requisition on Gen. Wadsworth, then in Washington, for 2,000 contrabands for that purpose. On the 27th of September he writes to Gen. Halleck:

AND PROPOSES TO FORM A MILITARY SCHOOL.

"My present purpose is to hold the army about as it now is, rendering Harper's Ferry secure, and watching the river closely, intending to attack the enemy should he attempt to cross to this side. Our possession of Harper's Ferry gives us too great advantage of a secure anchorage; but we cannot avail ourselves of it until the railroad bridge is finished, because we cannot then supply a greater number of troops than we now have on the Virginia side at that point. When the river rises to that the enemy cannot cross in force, I purpose concentrating the army somewhere near Harper's Ferry, and then acting according to circumstances, viz: Moving on Winchester if, from the position and attitude of the enemy, we are likely to gain a great advantage by doing so; or else devoting a reasonable time to the organization of the army and instruction of the new troops preparatory to an advance on whatever line may be determined. In any event, I regard it as absolutely necessary to send new regiments at once to the old corps for purposes of instruction, and that the old regiments be filled up once."

"My own view of the proper policy to be pursued is to retain in Washington merely the force necessary to garrison it, and to send everything else available to the front to the army. The railroads give us the means of promptly re-enforcing Washington, should it be necessary. If I am re-enforced as I ask, and am allowed to take my own course, I will hold myself responsible for the safety of Washington."

MCLELLAN KEEPS HIS MEN IN CAMP.

On the 7th of October Gen. Halleck replies. After referring to the draft expected in some of the Northern States he says:

"But you cannot delay the operations of the army for these drafts. It must move, and the old regiments must remain in their crippled condition. The convalescence, however, will help a little. The country is becoming very impatient at the want of activity in your army, and we must push it on."

"I am satisfied that the enemy are falling back toward Richmond. We must follow them and seek to cut them off. There is a decided want of loyalty in our troops. They have a much less idea of duty and of the necessity of a defeat, a reduction of baggage and baggage-trains will cut them off; but the real difficulty is they are not sufficiently exercised in marching; they lie still in camp too long."

"After a hard march one day is time enough to rest, lying still beyond that time does not rest the men. If we compare

the average distance marched per month by our troops for the last year with that of the Rebels, or with European armies in the field, we will see why our troops march no better. They are not sufficiently exercised to make them good and efficient soldiers."

On the 1st of October Gen. McClellan asked for authority to build a double-track suspension bridge and a permanent wagon bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, which Gen. Halleck declined to give. About that time the President visited the army. After his return to Washington the following order was sent to Gen. McClellan by Gen. Halleck:

M'CLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE.

"WAR DEPARTMENT,

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Oct. 6, 1862."

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows: The President directs that you cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy or drive him South. Your army must move now while the roads are good."

"If you cross the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover the latter by your line of operations, you can be re-enforced with 30,000 men. If you move up the valley of the Shenandoah, not more than 12,000 or 15,000 can be sent to you. The President advises the interior line between Washington and the enemy, but does not order it. He is very desirous that your army move as soon as possible. You will immediately report what time you adopt, and when you intend to cross the river; also, to what point the re-enforcements are to be sent. It is necessary that a plan of your operations be positively determined on before orders are given for building bridges or repairing railroads."

"I am directed to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in-Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions."

"W. H. HALLECK, General-in-Chief."

"Maj.-Gen. M'CLELLAN."

To this Gen. McClellan replies on the same day:

"It is important, in making my decision regarding the route to be taken by the army, that I should know, first, what description of troops I am to be re-enforced with upon the Shenandoah route, and also upon the other route between the enemy and Washington; whether they are to be old or new troops, or what proportion of each. If possible, I should be glad to have Peck's division sent to me, if it can be got here within a reasonable time."

"Second. Will you inform me what the present condition of the Alexandria and Leesburg Railroad is; also the Manassas Gap Railroad; and what time it would require to put them in working order? It is believed that the Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad is not materially injured."

To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th:

"The Manassas Gap Road can be repaired in a few days. The Leesburg Road is much more injured. You can reach the former in less time than would be required to repair the latter. The troops to be sent you will be partly new and partly old—mostly new."

HIS PLANS AND FEARS.

On the same day Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"After a full consultation with the corps commanders in my vicinity, I have determined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah for immediate operations against the enemy now near Winchester. On no other line north of Washington can the army be supplied, nor can it on any other cover Maryland and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross the river below the mouth of the Shenandoah, we would leave it in the power of the enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus check the movements. In the same case we would voluntarily give him the advantage of the strong line of the Shenandoah, no point of which could be reached by us in advance of him. I see no objective point of strategical value to be gained or sought for by a movement between the Shenandoah and Washington."

"I wish to state distinctly that I do not regard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as important for ulterior objects. It is important only so long as the enemy remains near Winchester. And we cannot follow that line far beyond that point, simply because the country is destitute of supplies, and we have not sufficient means of transportation to enable us to advance more than 20 or 35 miles beyond a railroad or canal terminus. If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall back upon Staunton, it will be impossible for us to pursue him by that route, and we must then take a new line of operations based upon water or railway communication."

"The only possible object to be gained by an advance from this vicinity is to fight the enemy near Winchester. If they retreat, we have nothing to gain by pursuing them, and, in fact, cannot do so to any great distance. The objects I proposed to myself are—to fight the enemy, if they remain near Winchester; or, failing in that, to force them to abandon the Valley of the Shenandoah, there to adopt a new and decisive line of operations which shall strike at the heart of the Rebellion."

"I have taken all possible measures to insure the most prompt equipment of the troops. But, from all that I can learn, it will be at least three days before the first, fifth, and sixth corps are in readiness to move from their present camps. The need shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents, &c. I beg to assure you that not an hour will be lost in carrying your instructions into effect."

"Please send the re-enforcements to Harper's Ferry. I would prefer that the new regiments be sent as regiments, not brigaded, unless already done so with old troops. I would again ask for Peck's division, and, if possible, Heintzelman's corps. If the enemy give fight near Winchester, it will be a desperate affair, requiring all our resources. I hope that no time will be lost in sending forward the re-enforcements, that I may get them in hand as soon as possible."

STUART'S CAVALRY RAID.

On the 10th of October the Rebel General, Stuart, made his raid into Pennsylvania, returning into Virginia, having made the entire circuit of our army. On the 13th Gen. McClellan reported to Gen. Halleck the result of the raid, and ascribed its success to the deficiency of our cavalry, and urged "the imperative necessity of at once supplying this army, including the command of Gen. Banks, with a sufficient number of horses to remount every dismounted cavalry soldier within the shortest possible time. If this is not done we shall be constantly exposed to Rebel cavalry raids."

To this Gen. Halleck replies: "Your telegram of 7 p. m. yesterday is just received. As I have already informed you, the Government has been and is making every possible effort to increase the cavalry force. Remounts are sent to you as rapidly as they can be procured. The President has read your telegram, and directs me to suggest that if the enemy had more occupation south of the river, his cavalry would not be so likely to make raids north of it."

THE PRESIDENT TO M'CLELLAN.

On the 13th of October the President wrote to Gen. McClellan concerning the operations of the army. And on the 17th of October Gen. McClellan wrote in reply. The letter of the President and the reply of Gen. McClellan are as follows:

"EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, Oct. 13, 1862."

"MY DEAR SIR: You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?"

"As I understand, you telegraphed Gen. Halleck that you cannot sustain your army at Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now sustain his army at Winchester at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now waggons from Culpepper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. Certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the remainder of Autumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores the question of time, which cannot and must not be ignored."

"Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is, 'to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible without exposing your own.' You seem to act as if this applies against you, but cannot apply in your favor. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier."

"Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his."

"You know I desired, but did not order, you to cross the Potomac below instead of above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this

would at once menace the enemy's communications, which I would seize if he would permit. If he should move northward, I would follow him closely, holding his communications. If he should prevent our seizing his communications, and move toward Richmond, I would press closely to him, fight him if a favorable opportunity should present, and at least try to beat him to Richmond on the inside track. I say 'try'; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, moving neither north nor south, I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. This proposition is a simple truth, and is too important to be lost sight of for a moment. In coming to us, he tends us an advantage which we should not waive. We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond.

"Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side, away from the enemy, is remarkable, as it were by the different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub toward the rim, and this, whether you move directly by the chord or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The chord-line, as you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally the Potomac, by Aquia Creek, meet you at all points from Washington. The same, only the lines lengthened a little, if you press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge I understand to be about the following distances from Harper's Ferry, to wit: Vestal's, five miles; Gregory's, thirteen; Snicker's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty-eight; Manassas, thirty-eight; Chester, forty-five, and Thornton's, fifty-three. I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When, at length, running for Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way; if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

"Yours, truly,

"Maj.-Gen. McCLELLAN."

"A. LINCOLN."

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,
"CAMP IN PLEASANT VALLEY, Oct. 17, 1862."

"Sir: Your letter of the 13th inst. reached me yesterday morning, by the hands of Col. Perkins.

"I had sent our strong reconnoissances, early in the morning, in the direction of Charlestown, Leetown &c., and, as sharp artillery firing was heard, I felt it incumbent to go to the front. I did not leave Charlestown until dark, so that I have been unable to give to your Excellency's letter that full and respectful consideration which it merits at my hands.

"I do not wish to detain Col. Perkins beyond this morning's train. I therefore think it best to send him back with this simple acknowledgment of the receipt of your Excellency's letter. I am not wedded to any particular plan of operations. I hope to have, to-day, reliable information as to the position of the enemy, whom I still believe to be between Bunker Hill and Winchester. I promise you that I will give to your views the fullest and most unprejudiced consideration, and that it is my intention to advance the moment my men are shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently renovated to be available.

"Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which differs at all from your views, without first fully explaining my reasons, and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you.

"I am, Sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"GEO. B. McCLELLAN,

"Major-General United States Army.

"His Excellency the President."

MORE RE-ENFORCEMENTS WANTED.

Gen. McClellan continued to ask for re-enforcements—for horses—saying that the issue to his army was only 150 per week; and for clothing, stating that his army needed shoes and other articles of clothing, and "had for some time past been suffering for the want of it," and that he was "constrained to believe that it was in a great degree owing to the want of proper action on the part of the Quartermaster's Department." The subject was referred to the Quartermaster-General, and he was called upon for a statement in regard to the matter. There was much correspondence upon the subject between Gen. Halleck, Gen. McClellan, and Gen. Meigs. The result of the examination is fully stated in the following communication of the Secretary of War, of the 27th of October, and the reply of Gen. Halleck, of the 28th of October:

M'CLELLAN'S MISREPRESENTATIONS.

"WAR DEPARTMENT."

"WASHINGTON CITY, Oct. 27, 1862."

"GENERAL: It has been publicly stated that the army under Gen. McClellan has been unable to move, during the fine weather of this Fall, for want of shoes, clothing, and other supplies. You will please report to this Department upon the following points:

"First: To whom, and in what manner, the requisitions for supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan have been made since you assumed command as General-in-Chief; and whether any requisition for supplies of any kind has since that time been made upon the Secretary of War, or communication had with him, except through you?

"Second: If you, as General-in-Chief, have taken pains to ascertain the condition of the army in respect to the supplies of shoes, clothing, arms, and other necessities; and whether there has been any neglect or delay, on any Department or Bureau, in filling the requisitions for supplies; and what has been, and is, the condition of that army, as compared with other armies, in respect to supplies?

"Third: At what date, after the battle of Antietam, the orders to advance against the enemy were given to Gen. McClellan, and how often have they been repeated?

"Fourth: Whether, in your opinion, there has been any want in the army under Gen. McClellan of shoes, clothing, arms, or other equipments or supplies, that ought to have prevented its advance against the enemy when the order was given?

"Fifth: How long was it after the orders to advance were given to Gen. McClellan before he informed you that any shoes or clothing were wanted in his army, and what are his means of promptly communicating the wants of the army to you, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department?

"EDWIN M. STANTON,

"Secretary of War.

"Maj.-Gen. HALLECK, General-in-Chief."

"WASHINGTON, Oct. 28, 1862."

"Sir: In reply to the several interrogatories contained in your letter of yesterday, I have to report:

"First: That requisitions for supplies to the army under Gen. McClellan are made by his staff officers on the chiefs of bureaus here; that is, for Quartermaster's supplies by his Chief Quartermaster on the Quartermaster-General; for Commissary supplies by his Chief Commissary on the Commissary-General, &c. No such requisitions have been, to my knowledge, made upon the Secretary of War, and none upon the General-in-Chief.

"Second: On several occasions Gen. McClellan has telegraphed to me that his army was deficient in certain supplies. All these telegrams were immediately referred to the heads of bureaus, with orders to report. It was ascertained that in every instance the requisitions had been immediately filled, except one, where the Quartermaster-General had been obliged to send from Philadelphia certain articles of clothing, tents, &c., not having a full supply here.

"There has not been, so far as I could ascertain, any neglect or delay in any department or bureau in issuing all supplies asked for by Gen. McClellan, or by the officers of his staff. Delays have occasionally occurred in forwarding supplies by rail, on account of the crowded condition of the depots or of a want of cars; but whenever notified of this, agents have been sent out to remove the difficulty. Under the excellent superintendence of Gen. Haupt I think these delays have been less frequent and of shorter duration than is usual with freight trains. Any army of the size of that of Gen. McClellan will frequently be for some days without the supplies asked for, on account of neglect in making timely requisitions, and unavoidable delays in forwarding them, and in distributing them to the different brigades and regiments. From all the information I can obtain, I am of the opinion that the requisitions from that army have been filled more promptly, and that the men, as a general rule, have been better supplied than our armies operating in the West. The latter have operated at much greater distances from the sources of supply, and have had far less facilities for transportation. In fine, I believe that no armies in the world, while in campaign, have been more promptly or better supplied than ours.

"Third: Soon after the battle of Antietam Gen. McClellan was urged to give me information of his intended movements

in order that, if he moved between the enemy and Washington, reinforcements could be sent from this place. On the 1st of October, finding that he proposed to operate from Harper's Ferry, I urged him to cross the river at once and give battle to the enemy, pointing out to him the disadvantage of delaying till the autumn rains had swollen the Potomac and impaired the roads. On the 6th of Oct. he was peremptorily ordered "to cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army must move now while the roads are good." It will be observed that three weeks have elapsed since this order was given.

Fourth: In my opinion there has been no such want of supplies in the army under Gen. McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the orders to advance against the enemy. Had he moved to the south side of the Potomac he could have received his supplies almost as readily as, by remaining inactive, on the north side.

Fifth: On the 7th of October, in a telegram in regard to his intended movements, Gen. McClellan stated that it would require at least three days to supply the First, Fifth and Sixth Corps; that they needed shoes and other indispensable articles of clothing, as well as shelter tents. No complaint was made that any requisitions had not been filled; and it was inferred from his language that he was only waiting for the distribution of his supplies.

"On the 11th he telegraphed that a portion of his supplies, sent by rail, had been delayed. As already stated, agents were immediately sent from here to investigate this complaint; and they reported that everything had gone forward. On the same date (the 11th) he spoke of many of his horses having broken down by fatigue. On the 12th he complains that the rate of supply was only 100 horses per week for the entire army, there and in front of Washington. I immediately directed the Quartermaster-General to inquire into this matter, and to report why a larger number was not furnished. Gen. Meigs reported on the 14th that the average issue of horses to Gen. McClellan's army, in the field and in front of Washington, for the previous six weeks, had been 1,450 per week, or 8,750 in all; in addition, that a large number of mules had been supplied; and that the number of animals with Gen. McClellan's army, on the Upper Potomac, was over 21,000. He also reported that he was then sending to the army all the horses he could procure.

"On the 18th Gen. McClellan states, in regard to Gen. Meigs's report, that he had filled every requisition for shoes and clothing; Gen. Meigs may have ordered those articles to be forwarded, but they have not reached our depots; and unless greater effort to insure prompt transmission is made by the department of which Gen. Meigs is the head, they might as well remain in New-York or Philadelphia, so far as this army is concerned." I have directly called Gen. Meigs's attention to this apparent neglect of his department. On the 25th he reported, as the result of his investigation, that 43,000 pairs of boots and shoes had been received by the quartermaster of Gen. McClellan's army at Harper's Ferry, Frederick, and Hagerstown; that 23,000 pairs were at Harper's Ferry depot on the 21st; that 10,000 more were on their way; and 15,000 more ordered. Col. J. G. Ball, aide-de-camp and chief quartermaster to Gen. McClellan, telegraphed on the 25th: "The suffering for want of clothing is exaggerated I think; and certainly might have been remedied by timely requisitions of regimental and brigade quartermasters." On the 26th he telegraphed to the quartermaster-general that: "the clothing was not detained in the care at the depots; such complaints are groundless. The fact is, the clothing arrives and is issued; but more is still needed. I have ordered more than would seem necessary from any depot furnished me; and I beg to remind you that you have always very promptly met all my requisitions as far as clothing is concerned. Our department is not at fault. It provides as soon as due notice is given. I foresee to time when an army of over 100,000 men will not call for clothing and other articles."

"In regard to Gen. McClellan's means of promptly communicating the wants of his army to me, or to the proper bureaus of the War Department, I repeat; that, in addition to the ordinary mails, he has been in hourly communication with Washington by telegraph.

"It is due to Gen. Meigs that I should submit herewith a copy of a telegram received by him from Gen. McClellan. [See document.]

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

"Hon. EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War."

McCLELLAN STILL DELAYS.

On Oct. 21, Gen. McClellan informs Gen. Halleck that he has nearly accomplished supplying his army with the clothing absolutely necessary for marching. He complains, however, of his want of cavalry, and concludes:

"Without more cavalry horses our communications, from the moment we march, would be at the mercy of the large cavalry force of the enemy, and it would not be possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain the necessary information of the position and movements of the enemy in such a way as to insure success. My experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient cavalry force. Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask whether the President desires me to march on the enemy at once or to await the reception of the new horses, every possible step having been taken to insure their prompt arrival."

To this Gen. Halleck replies on the same day, at 3:30 p. m.:

"Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the President. It directs me to say that he has no change to make in his order of the 6th inst. If you have not been, and are not now, in condition to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. The President does not expect impossibilities, but is very anxious that all this good weather should not be wasted in inactivity."

On the 22d of October Gen. McClellan telegraphs:

"After full consultation, I have decided to move upon the line indicated by the President in his letter of the 13th inst., and have accordingly taken steps to execute the movement. I will inform you, from time to time, of this occupation of Leesburg, Lillsborough, Snickersville, &c. I shall need all the cavalry and other reinforcements you can send me from Washington."

On the 23d Gen. Halleck replies:

"Should you move as proposed in your telegram of yesterday, I can send about 20,000 men from Washington to reinforce you."

ABOUT CAVALRY.

On the 25th of October Gen. McClellan transmits to Gen. Halleck a report of Col. Robert Williams, commanding a detachment of cavalry, in which it is stated that nearly half his horses are unsound, from "sore tongue, prosoe, and consequent lameness and sore backs," and that "the horses which are still sound are absolutely broken down from fatigue and want of flesh."

To this the President replies to Gen. McClellan on the same day:

"I have just read your dispatch about sore tongue and fatigued horses. Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"

Gen. McClellan replies on the same day:

"In reply to your telegram of this date, I have the honor to state, from the time this army left Washington, on the 7th of September, my cavalry has been constantly employed in making reconnoissances, scouting and picketing. Since the battle of Antietam six regiments have made, in 100 days, 100,000 miles, marching 55 miles in one day, while endeavoring to reach Stuart's cavalry. Gen. Pleasanton, in his official report, states that he, with the remainder of our available cavalry, while on Stuart's track, marched 73 miles in 24 hours. Beside these two remarkable expeditions, our cavalry has been engaged in picketing and scouting 150 miles of river front since the battle of Antietam, and has made repeated reconnoissances since that time, engaging the enemy on every occasion, and, indeed, it has performed heroic services since the battle thus before. I beg that you will also consider that this same cavalry was brought from the peninsula, where it encountered most laborious service, and was, at the commencement of this campaign, in low condition, and from that time to the present has had nothing to recruit. If any instance can be found where overworked cavalry has performed more labor than mine since the battle of Antietam I am not conscious of it."

The following is the reply of the President:

"Yours, in reply to mine, about horses, received. Of course, you know the facts better than I. Still, two considerations remain: Stuart's cavalry outnumbered ours, having certainly done more marked service on the peninsula and everywhere since. Secondly, will not the issue of our army be a relief to the cavalry, compelling the enemy to concentrate instead of 'foraging' in squads everywhere?"

MORE MEN WANTED.

On the 27th of October, Gen. McClellan telegraphed to the President:

"Your excellency is aware of the very great reduction of numbers that has taken place in most of the old regiments of this command, and how necessary it is to fill up these skeletons before taking them again into action. I have the honor, therefore, to request that the order to fill up the old regiments with drafted men may at once be issued."

To this the President replies as follows on the same day:

"Your dispatch of 3 p. m. of to-day, in regard to filling up old regiments with drafted men, is received, and the request therein shall be complied with as far as practicable.

"And now I ask a distinct answer to the question: Is it your purpose not to go into action until the men now being drafted in the States are incorporated in the old regiments?"

The following is Gen. McClellan's reply—after referring to previous communications in relation to filling up the old regiments, he says:

"In this press of business, I then called an aide, and telling him I had conversed with you upon the subject, I directed him to write for me a dispatch, asking your excellency to have the necessary order given. I regret to say that this officer, after writing the dispatch, finding me still engaged, sent it to the telegraph office without first submitting it to me, under the impression that he had communicated my

views. He, however, unfortunately added, 'before taking them into action again.' This phrase was not authorized or intended by me. It has conveyed altogether an erroneous impression as to my plans and intentions. To your excellency's question I answer distinctly that I have not had any idea of postponing the advance until the old regiments are filled by drafted men. I commenced crossing the army into Virginia yesterday, and shall push forward as rapidly as possible to endeavor to meet the enemy."

Your Committee would say that, in their opinion, a staff officer who could, from negligence or other cause, add to a dispatch from the General commanding an army to the President, that which "was not authorized or intended," should at least be assigned to some other duty.

M'CLELLAN TAKES FOUR WEEKS TO CROSS THE POTOMAC.

The movement of the army across the river, which was commenced upon the 26th of October, continued slowly, until on the 5th of November Gen. McClellan announced to the President that the last corps of his army finished crossing on the 3d of November, *just four weeks from the time the order to cross was given.*

In the letter to the President, of the 17th of October, Gen. McClellan writes:

"Your Excellency may be assured that I will not adopt a course which differs at all from your view without first fully explaining my reasons and giving you time to issue such instructions as may seem best to you."

THE END OF M'CLELLAN.

Gen. McClellan was relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, in pursuance of the following orders:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

"WASHINGTON, D. C., Nov. 5, 1862. }

"GENERAL: On receipt of the order of the President, sent herewith, you will immediately turn over your command to Major-Gen. Burnside, and repair to Trenton, New-Jersey, reporting on your arrival at that place by telegraph for further orders. Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"H. W. HALLECK, General-in-Chief.

"Major-Gen. McClellan, Commanding, &c., &c."

"WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }

"WASHINGTON, Nov. 5, 1862. }

"GENERAL ORDERS, No. 132.—By direction of the President of the United States, it is ordered that Major-Gen. McClellan be relieved from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and that Major-Gen. Burnside take the command of that army.

"By order of the Secretary of War.

"E. D. TOWNSEND, Assistant Adjutant-General."

OPERATIONS UNDER GEN. BURNSIDE.

Upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomac, Gen. Burnside at once determined to follow the line of operations which he had previously suggested to Gen. McClellan; that is, to make Fredericksburg the base of his operations. He assumed command on the 7th or 8th of November, and on the 9th forwarded to Washington his proposed plan of operations. On the 12th of November Gen. Halleck came to Warrenton, and, with Gen. Meigs, had a conversation with Gen. Burnside upon the future movements of the army.

Gen. Burnside stated that his plan was "to concentrate the army in the neighborhood of Warrenton; to make a small movement across the Rappahannock, as a feint, with a view to divert the attention of the enemy, and lead them to believe that we were going to move in the direction of Gordonsville, and then to make a rapid movement of the whole army to Fredericksburg;" for the reason that "we would all the time be as near Washington as would the enemy, and after arriving at Fredericksburg we would be at a point nearer to Richmond than we would be even if we should take Gordonsville."

THE PONTOONS—WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR DELAY?

Gen. Burnside desired to have provisions and forage, together with pontoons to enable the army to cross the Rappahannock. Gen. Meigs testifies that while at Warrenton he wrote an order to Gen. Woodbury, in Washington, to call on the Quartermaster at Washington for transportation for the

pontoons to Acquia Creek, which order Gen. Halleck signed, and it was sent off to the telegraph office.

WOODBURY SAYS HE WAS NOT.

Gen. Woodbury states that he received that order on the morning of the 13th of Nov. He testifies:

"Gen. Halleck's order to me of the 13th, in which it is said that the army was preparing to march to Fredericksburg. As to the time when the movement would be made I received a very informal information. Fearing, however, that the movement would be precipitate, I wrote to Gen. Halleck, in the afternoon of the 13th, and urged him to delay the movement some five days, in order that the necessary preparations might be made to insure success. To this he replied that he would do nothing to delay for an instant the advance of the army on Richmond. I rejoined that my suggestion was not intended to cause delay, but rather to prevent it. In making this suggestion I had reference not only to the pontoon train, but the landings still to be created for the Quartermaster and Commissary Departments."

HALLECK SAYS HE WAS NOT.

Gen. Halleck testifies:

"I will state that all the troops in Washington and its vicinity were under the command of Gen. McClellan when he was relieved, and he issued his orders directly to the commanding officer of Washington, with the understanding that no troops should be moved from the command of Washington until I was notified by Gen. McClellan or the commanding officer here. In all other respects they were under his direction. Gen. Burnside, when he relieved him, was told that they remained precisely the same as before. On my visit to Gen. Burnside, at Warrenton, on the 12th of November, in speaking about the boats and things that he required from here, I repeated to him that they were all subject to his orders with the single exception, that no troops or necessity of the commanding officer here reporting the order for the boats here, the order was drawn up upon his table, and signed by me, directly to Gen. Woodbury, on the evening of the 12th, I think—the evening that I was there. I saw Gen. Woodbury on my return, and he told me he had received the order. I told him that in all these matters he was under Gen. Burnside's direction. I had nothing further to give him, except to communicate that order to him. In conversation with him and Gen. Meigs, it was proposed that the train of pontoons should go down by land, as they could be gotten down sooner in that way, without interfering with the supplies which had to be sent to Acquia Creek. I gave no other order or direction in relation to the matter than that all other matters were under Gen. Burnside's direction. He also informed me, while at Warrenton, that Capt. Duane, Chief of the Engineers, had also sent an order to Harper's Ferry for the pontoon train there to go down. The order had been issued. They being under Gen. Burnside's immediate and direct command, I did not interfere at all in relation to them.

"Question. Do you know whether there was any delay in starting them, or in their progress there?

"Answer. I heard that there was a delay from the steamers getting aground with the pontoons; and there was a delay, as I understood, in the train going down by land, on account of the difficulty of the roads, and the inexperience, perhaps, of the officers in command, and it had to be taken by water part of the way; it could not go through by land. I was not present from the time I received that order, so I cannot say mainly from accident and the elements, that no man had any contr. over. Gen. Burnside telegraphed to me in relation to Gen. Woodbury, thinking that he had not used due diligence; but afterward told me he was perfectly satisfied with what Gen. Woodbury had done, and that he did not know but what the commanding officer of the train that went down had done his duty also; that he was disposed to make no further investigation of that matter; that he was pretty well satisfied with the result. Question. Was there any request for you to delay the advance of the men until the boats arrived, or anything of that kind?

"Answer. No, Sir. I remember this, that Gen. Woodbury, in conversation with me, said that Gen. Burnside could not get down for several days after I told him, and that he could not land the boats until Gen. Burnside arrived; I think I remarked to him that I did not know exactly the day when Gen. Burnside would move; but I said I was well satisfied that Gen. Burnside did not know Burnside. While I was at Warrenton he proposed this movement, and he was directed to make all preparations for it, but not to begin it until the President was consulted. I returned, on the afternoon of the 13th, and, I think, on the morning of the 14th, I had a interview with the President, in which he consented to Gen. Burnside's plans, and I immediately telegraphed to him to go ahead as he had proposed. I understood that there was considerable delay in getting the boats from Acquia down to the Rappahannock River, on account of the bad roads, difficulty of transportation, &c., but no other delay than that which would naturally occur over a rough country like that; and accidental delay in laying the bridges was reported to me, from the inexperience of the pontoons, who had the upper bridges; there was considerable delay in that. We could not commence the repair of the railroad until Gen. Burnside took possession of it, as it was in the possession of the enemy. That was understood between him and Gen. Meigs, and the presence of Gen. Burnside went out with me to make the arrangements for repairing the roads as early as possible. I remember the conversation; he could not land anything, but would have everything down ready as soon as he could, and

when he found Gen. Burnside was in possession, he would commence."

BURNSIDE EVIDENTLY WAS NOT.

Gen. Burnside testifies in relation to the forwarding of the pontoons:

"I understood that Gen. Halleck was to give the necessary orders, and then the officers who should receive those orders were the ones responsible for the pontoons coming here (Fredericksburg). I could have carried out that part of the plan through officers of my own; but, having just taken the command of an army with which I was but little acquainted, it was evident that it was as much as I could attend to, with the assistance of all my officers, to change its position from Warrenton to Fredericksburg; and I felt, indeed I expected, that all the parts of the plan which were to be executed in Washington would be attended to by the officers at that place, under the direction of the different departments to which those parts of the plan appertained.

"Question. Did you or not understand that you yourself were to be responsible for seeing that those orders were carried out?"

"Answer. I did not. I never imagined for a moment that I had to carry out anything that required to be done in Washington."

On the 16th of November Gen. Burnside started the columns of his army from Warrenton to Fredericksburg, not having heard anything of the delay of the pontoons from Washington. The telegram announcing the delay did not reach Gen. Burnside until the 19th of November. The corps of Gen. Sumner was in the advance, and it was the intention that he should cross over to Fredericksburg and take possession of the place. But the non-arrival of the pontoons in time prevented the movement which had been contemplated, and necessitated the adoption of other measures.

THE BATTLE OF FREDERICKSBURG.

Gen. Burnside then began to make preparations for another movement, bringing up the pontoons as rapidly as possible, to enable his forces to cross the river.

The plan determined upon was to cross the river at two points; the right wing to cross opposite Fredericksburg, and the left wing to cross from three to four miles below the city. The left wing was composed of the Left Grand Division, with a corps from the Center Grand Division, making a force of from 50,000 to 60,000 men, the whole being under command of Maj.-Gen. Franklin. The crossing was made successfully at both points, but with much opposition from sharpshooters on the right.

PLAN OF BATTLE.

Gen. Burnside states the following in regard to his plan of attack:

"The enemy had cut a road along in the rear of the line of heights where we made our attack, by means of which they connected the two wings of their army, and avoided a long detour around through a bad country. I obtained from a colored man, from the other side of the town, information in regard to this new road, which proved to be correct. I wanted to obtain possession of that new road, and that was my reason for making an attack on the extreme left. I did not intend to make the attack on the right until that position had been taken, which I supposed would stagger the enemy cutting their line in two; and then I proposed to make a direct attack on their front and drive them out of their works."

ORDERS TO FRANKLIN.

The following is the order to Gen. Franklin, who commanded the left:

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,"

"Gen. Hardie will carry this dispatch to you and remain with you during the day. The general commanding directs that you keep your whole command in position for a rapid movement down the old Richmond road, and you will send out at once a division, at least, to pass below Smithfield, to seize, if possible, the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, on this side of the Massaponax, taking care to keep it well supported, and its line of retreat open. He has ordered another column of a division or more to be moved from Gen. Sumner's command up the plank road to its intersection of the telegraph road, where they will divide, with a view to seizing the heights on both of those roads. Holding these heights, with the heights near Capt. Hamilton's, will, I hope, compel the enemy to evacuate the whole ridge between these points. He makes these moves by columns, distant from each other, with a view of avoiding the possibility of a collision of our own forces, which might occur in a general movement during the fog. Two of Gen. Hooker's divisions are in your rear at the bridges, and will remain there as supports. Copies of instructions to Gen. Sumner and Hooker will be forwarded to you by an orderly very soon. You will keep your whole command in readiness to move at once as soon as the fog lifts. The watchword which, if possible, should be given to every company, will be 'Scott.'"

"I have the honor to be, General, very respectfully, your obedient servant," JOHN G. PARKIE, Chief of Staff.
"Major-Gen. FRANKLIN, Commanding Department, Grand Division Army of Potomac."

FRANKLIN'S INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS.

Gen. Franklin states, when last examined, that he received the above order at about 7:30 a. m., and that he at once took measures to carry out what he considered to be the meaning of the order, that is, "an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was." In his testimony, given when your Committee were at Falmouth, he says: "I put in all the troops that I thought it proper and prudent to put in. I fought the whole strength of my command, as far as I could, and at the same time keep my connection with the river open."

FRANKLIN RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEFEAT.

From the testimony it would appear that the attack was in reality made by one of the smallest divisions in Gen. Franklin's command—the division of Gen. Meade, numbering about 4,500 men. This division was supported on its right by Gen. Gibbon's Division of about 5,000 men. On the left was Gen. Doubleday's Division, forming the extreme left of our line, nearly at right angles with Gen. Meade's Division, and extending to the river. Just as Gen. Meade's Division advanced to the attack, Gen. Birney's Division, of Gen. Stoneman's corps, numbering about 7,000, came up and took position immediately in rear of Gen. Meade.

GEN. BIRNEY FAILS TO SUPPORT MEADE'S ATTACK.

The division of Gen. Meade succeeded in piercing the first line of the enemy, and gaining the crest of the hill. Gen. Gibbon, seeing Gen. Meade advancing to the attack, ordered his division forward. After his last brigade had advanced, driving the enemy with the bayonet, and he was preparing his batteries to open upon a Rebel regiment that made their appearance on his left, Gen. Gibbon was wounded and taken from the field. Gen. Meade's division having reached the crest of the hill, formed themselves in the presence of the reserves of the enemy, who opened fire upon them in front, and they also received a fire upon their flank. The superiority of the enemy was so overwhelming that Meade's division was forced back, as was also Gibbon's division. The enemy pursued until checked by Birney's division. Our forces continued to hold their position, without renewing the attack, until they were ordered to withdraw across the river.

The losses sustained in the attack, in killed, wounded, and missing, were as follows: Meade's division, 1,700; Gibbon's division, 1,240; Birney's division, 961.

FRANKLIN DISOBEYS A DIRECT ORDER TO ATTACK.

Gen. Burnside, upon hearing of the small force ordered to attack the enemy, sent an order to Gen. Franklin to make a vigorous attack with his whole force. Several of the witnesses testify that had the attack been renewed with all the available force under Gen. Franklin's command it would have been successful. Gen. Franklin testifies that it was not an order, but a request, and that when he received it it was too late to renew the attack, and therefore he did not do it.

Gen. Franklin testifies as follows:

"The order under which I was acting directed that the line of retreat should be kept open. It also directed that I should hold my troops in position for a rapid march down the Richmond road. I never dreamed that this was considered a strong attack at all, until since the battle took place. At that time I had no idea that it was the main attack, but supposed it was an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy was. * * * I was strengthened in this opinion by the staff officer who brought it, (the order)."

"Question. Did you not understand, from this order, that you were to use all the troops necessary to seize and hold the Heights near Capt. Hamilton's, and that the General commanding considered that that was necessary to be done in order to secure success?"

"Answer. No; I did not. I should suppose that the order would not have limited me to 'at least a division,' as the wording of it shows, had such been his intention; and, besides, he directs me to keep my whole command in position to move

along the old Richmond road. If he had intended me to use my whole force, if necessary, to hold that hill, he hardly would have coupled it with the condition to keep my command in readiness for this other movement.

"Question. Was the other movement feasible until after the possession of those heights by our troops?"

"Answer. I think that the other movement, if it had been ordered with my whole force, would have necessarily involved the possession of those heights. Had I been ordered to move my whole force along the Richmond road, I should have been compelled to take all that would be found in the road, and those heights would have been in the road.

"Question. As it was indispensable that we should have possession of those heights in order to move down the old Richmond road, and as you were ordered to send out at least one division to pass below Smithfield and seize, if possible, those heights, did you not deem that the order required of you that you should, when repulsed in the first attempt, renew the attack?"

"Answer. I think it did; but by the time the Rebels were driven back into the woods by Burney's division and Sickles's division, it was past 3 o'clock. It was dark, at that time, by 6 o'clock, and it was too late then to make such an attempt with the slightest hope of success."

The testimony of all the witnesses before your Committee proves most conclusively that, had the attack been made upon the left with all the force which Gen. Franklin could have used for that purpose, the plan of Gen. Burnside would have been completely successful, and our army would have achieved a most brilliant victory.

After the attack on Saturday, our army remained in position until Monday night, when it was withdrawn across the river without loss.

Your Committee have not considered it essential to report upon the operations of the right wing of our army in this battle, for the reason that the success of the movement evidently depended to a very great extent upon the successful operation of the left. Although our troops on the right fought most gallantly, making repeated attacks, the strength of the enemy's position was such that our forces were compelled to retire.

AFTER FREDERICKSBURG.

On Jan. 26, 1863, the following resolution was adopted by the Senate, and referred to your Committee:

"Resolved, That the Committee on the Conduct of the War be instructed to inquire whether Major-Gen. A. E. Burnside has, since the battle of Fredericksburg, formed any plans for the movement of the Army of the Potomac, or any portion of the same; and if so, whether any subordinate Generals of said army have written to or visited Washington, to oppose or interfere with the execution of such movements, and whether such proposed movements have been arrested or interfered with, and if so, by what authority."

Under that resolution, your Committee proceeded to take the testimony of Major-Gens. A. E. Burnside and John G. Parke, and Brig.-Gens. John Newton, John Cochrane, and William W. Averill. That testimony brings to light the following facts:

BURNSIDE'S PLANS.

Shortly after the battle of Fredericksburg, Gen. Burnside devised a plan for attacking the enemy in his front. The main army was to cross at a place some six or seven miles below Fredericksburg. The positions for the artillery to protect the crossing were all selected, the roads were all surveyed, and the corduroy was cut for preparing the roads. At the same time a feint of crossing was to be made some distance above Falmouth, which feint could be turned into a positive attack should the enemy discover the movement below; otherwise the main attack was to be made below.

A GRAND CAVALRY EXPEDITION.

In connection with this movement of the main army, a cavalry expedition was organized, consisting of 2,500 of the best cavalry in the Army of the Potomac, 1,000 of whom were picked men. The plan of that expedition was as follows: Accompanied by a brigade of infantry detailed to protect the crossing of the Rappahannock, it was to proceed up to Kelly's Ford; there the 1,000 picked men were to cross, and to proceed to the Rappahannock and cross the river at Raccoon Ford; then to go onward and cross the Virginia Central Railroad at Louisa Court-House; the James River at Goochland or Carter's, blowing up the locks of the James River Canal at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond and Lynchburg Railroad at a point south of there, blow-

ing up the iron-bridge at the place of crossing; cross the Richmond, Petersburg and Weldon Railroad where it crossed the Nottoway River, destroying the railroad bridge there; and then proceed on by Gen. Pryor's command, and effect a junction with Gen. Peck, at Suffolk, where steamers were to be in waiting to take them to Acquia Creek.

To distract the attention of the enemy, and deceive them in regard to which body of cavalry was the attacking column, at the time the thousand picked men crossed the Rappahannock, a portion of the remaining 1,500 was to proceed toward Warrenton; another portion toward Culpepper Court-House; and the remainder were to accompany the thousand picked men as far as Raccoon Ford, and then return. While this country expedition was in progress, the general movement was to be made across the river.

On the 26th of December, an order was issued for the entire command to prepare three days' cooked rations; to have their wagons filled with ten days' small rations, if possible; to have from ten to twelve days' supply of beef cattle with them; to take forage for their teams and their artillery and cavalry horses, and the requisite amount of ammunition—in fact, to be in a condition to move at twelve hours' notice.

GENS. COCHRANE AND NEWTON TRY TO PREJUDICE THE PRESIDENT AGAINST BURNSIDE.

Shortly after that order was issued Gen. John Newton and Gen. John Cochrane—the one commanding a division and the other a brigade in the left Grand Division, under Gen. Wm. B. Franklin came up to Washington on leave of absence. Previous to obtaining leave of absence from Gen. Franklin, they informed him and Gen. Wm. F. Smith that when they came to Washington they should take the opportunity to represent to some one in authority here the dispirited condition of the army, and the danger there was in attempting any movement against the enemy at that time.

When they reached Washington, Gen. Cochrane, as he states, endeavored to find certain members of Congress, to whom to make the desired communication. Failing to find them, he determined to seek an interview with the President for the purpose of making the communication directly to him. On proceeding to the President's house, he there met Secretary Seward, to whom he explained the object of his being there and the general purport of his proposed communication to the President, and requested him to procure an interview for them, which Mr. Seward promised to do, and which he did do.

THE GENERALS PREVARICATE.

That day the interview took place, and Gen. Newton opened the subject to the President. At first the President, as Gen. Newton expresses it, "very naturally conceived that they had come there for the purpose of injuring Gen. Burnside, and suggesting some other person to fill his place." Gen. Newton states, that while he firmly believed that the principal cause of the dispirited condition of the army was the want of confidence in the military capacity of Gen. Burnside, he deemed it improper to say so to the President "right square out," and therefore endeavored to convey the same idea indirectly. When asked if he considered it any less improper to do such a thing indirectly than it was to do it directly, he qualified his previous assertion by saying that his object was to inform the President of what he considered to be the condition of the army, in the hope that the President would make inquiry and learn the true cause for himself. Upon perceiving this impression upon the mind of the President, Gens. Newton and Cochrane state that they hastened to assure the President that he was entirely mistaken, and so far succeeded that at the close of the interview the President said to them he was glad they had called upon him, and that he hoped that good would result from the interview.

THE PRESIDENT INTERFERES.

To return to Gen. Burnside. The cavalry expe-

dition had started; the brigade of infantry detailed to accompany it had crossed the Rappahannock at Richard's Ford and returned by way of Ellis's Ford, leaving the way clear for the cavalry to cross at Kelly's Ford. The day they had arranged to make the crossing Gen. Burnside received from the President the following telegram:

"I have good reason for saying that you must not make a general movement without letting me know of it."

Gen. Burnside states that he could not imagine, at the time, what reason the President could have for sending him such a telegram. None of the officers of his command, except one or two of his staff who had remained in camp, had been told anything of his plan beyond the simple fact that a movement was to be made. He could only suppose that the dispatch related in some way to important military movements in other parts of the country, in which it was necessary to have cooperation.

THE CAVALRY HALTING.

Upon the receipt of that telegram, steps were immediately taken to halt the cavalry expedition where it then was (at Kelly's Ford) until further orders. A portion of it was shortly afterward sent off to intercept Stuart, who had just made a raid to Dumfries and the neighborhood of Fairfax Court-House, which it failed to do.

BURNSIDE COMES TO WASHINGTON.

Gen. Burnside came to Washington to ascertain from the President the true state of the case. He was informed by the President that some general officers from the Army of the Potomac, whose names he declined to give, had called upon him and represented that Gen. Burnside contemplated soon making a movement, and that the army was so dispirited and demoralized that any attempt to make a movement at that time must result in disaster; that no prominent officers in the Army of the Potomac were in favor of any movement at that time.

Gen. Burnside informed the President that none of his officers had been informed what his plan was, and then proceeded to explain it in detail to the President. He urged upon the President to grant him permission to carry it out, but the President declined to do so at that time. Gen. Halleck and Secretary Stanton were sent for, and then learned, for the first time, of the President's action in stopping the movement; although Gen. Halleck was previously aware that a movement was contemplated by Gen. Burnside. Gen. Halleck, with Gen. Burnside, held that the officers who had made those representations to the President should be at once dismissed the service. Gen. Burnside remained here at that time for two days, but no conclusion was reached upon the subject.

HIS PLANS BECOME KNOWN TO THE REBELS.

When he returned to his camp he learned that many of the details of the general movement, and the details of the cavalry expedition, had become known to the Rebel sympathizers in Washington, thereby rendering that plan impracticable. When asked to whom he had communicated his plans, he stated that he had told no one in Washington, except the President, Secretary Stanton, and Gen. Halleck; and in his camp none knew of it, except one or two of his staff officers, who remained in camp all the time. He professed himself unable to tell how his plans had become known to the enemy.

HE ASKS FOR ORDERS BUT GETS NONE.

A correspondence then took place between the President, Gen. Halleck and Gen. Burnside. Gen. Burnside desired distinct authority from Gen. Halleck, or some one authorized to give it, to make a movement across the river. While urging the importance and necessity for such a movement, he candidly admitted that there was hardly a general officer in his command who approved of it. While willing to take upon himself all the responsibility of the movement, and promising to keep in view the President's caution concerning any risk of destroying the army of the Potomac, he desired to have at least Gen. Halleck's sanction or permission to make the movement. Gen. Halleck replied that while he had

always favored a forward movement, he could not take the responsibility of giving any directions as to how and when it should be made.

HE TAKES THE RESPONSIBILITY.

Gen. Burnside then determined to make a movement without any further correspondence on the subject. He was unable to devise any as promising as the one just thwarted by this interference of his subordinate officers, *which interference gave the enemy the time, if not the means, to ascertain what he had proposed to do.* He, however, devised a plan of movement, and proceeded to put it in execution. As is well known, it was rendered abortive in consequence of the severe storm which took place shortly after the movement began.

Gen. Burnside states that, besides the inclemency of the weather, there was another powerful reason for abandoning the movement, viz: the almost universal feeling among his general officers against it. Some of those officers freely gave vent to their feelings in the presence of their inferiors.

GENERAL ORDER NO. 8.

In consequence of this, and also what had taken place during the battle of Fredericksburg, &c., Gen. Burnside directed an order to be issued, which he styled general order No. 8.

That order dismissed some officers from the service, subject to the approval of the President, relieved others from duty with the army of the Potomac, and also pronounced sentence of death upon some deserters who had been tried and convicted.

Gen. Burnside states that he had become satisfied that it was absolutely necessary that some such examples should be made, in order to enable him to maintain the proper authority over the army under his command. The order was duly signed and issued, and only waited publication.

Two or three of his most trusted staff officers represented to Gen. Burnside that should he then publish that order, he would force upon the President the necessity of at once sanctioning it, or, by refusing his approval, assume an attitude of hostility to Gen. Burnside. The publication of the order was accordingly delayed for the time.

THE PRESIDENT REFUSES TO SUSTAIN BURNSIDE.

Gen. Burnside came to Washington and laid the order before the President, with the distinct assurance that in no other way could he exercise a proper command over the Army of the Potomac; and he asked the President to sanction the order, or accept his resignation as major-general. *The President acknowledged that Gen. Burnside was right, but declined to decide without consulting with some of his advisers.* To this Gen. Burnside replied that, if the President took time for consultation, he would not be allowed to publish that order, and therefore asked to have his resignation accepted at once. This the President declined to do.

HOW BURNSIDE CAME TO BE RELIEVED.

Gen. Burnside returned to his camp and came again to Washington that night at the request of the President, and the next morning called upon the President for his decision. He was informed that the President declined to approve his order No. 8, but had concluded to relieve him from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and to appoint Gen. Hooker in his place. Thereupon Gen. Burnside again insisted that his resignation be accepted. This the President declined to do; and, after some urging, Gen. Burnside consented to take a leave of absence for thirty days, with the understanding that at the end of that time he should be assigned to duty, as he deemed it improper to hold a commission as major-general and receive his pay without rendering service therefor. *Gen. Burnside objected to the wording of the order which relieved him from his command, and which stated that it was "at his own request," as being unjust to him and unfounded in fact; but upon the representation that any other order would do injury to the cause, he consented to let it remain as it then read.*

The foregoing statement of the facts proved, to

gether with the testimony herewith submitted, so fully and directly meet the requirements of the resolution referred to them, that your Committee deem any comment by them to be entirely unnecessary.

CONCLUSION.

Your committee think it better to submit the testimony which they have taken in relation to the conduct of the war, without criticism to any considerable extent of military plans or movements, leaving each reader to form his own conclusions from the testimony, and such opinions of competent military men as it may contain.

As they look back over the struggle of the past two years, they feel that although we have not accomplished all that we hoped and expected within the time, still the great progress made gives us full assurance of final success.

When the Government took its first active steps toward resisting the Rebellion the Rebels had been for more than five months actively and openly making preparations to resist its authority and defy its jurisdiction. They had usurped the control of the machinery of one State government after another, and thus overawed the loyal people of those States. They had even so far control of the Federal Government itself as to make it not only acquiesce, for the time being, in measures for its own destruction, but contribute to that end. They had seized and taken into their possession the arms and munitions of war of the government. They had scattered and demoralized the army, and sent the navy to the most distant parts of the world.

There was treason in the Executive mansion, treason in the Cabinet, treason in the Senate and the House of Representatives, treason in the army and navy, treason in every department, bureau and office connected with the Government. When the new Administration came into power it was necessarily obliged to adopt its measures with the greatest caution, scarcely knowing friend from foe. An army and navy had to be created. There was scarcely a battalion of loyal national troops to protect the capital; and the first sense of security felt in the capital was when the volunteer troops entered it, summoned from their homes for its protection. At the same time it was with great difficulty that the loyal people could make themselves believe that any serious resistance to the authority of the Government would be attempted. There were not wanting those who confidently asserted that it was but an outburst of disappointed partisan spirit, which they predicted would yield to an exhibition of force, and a determined and united spirit on the part of the people of the loyal States to suppress it. Instead of such an easy suppression, we have spent two years, almost, in warfare. We have thrown into the field a million of men. We have poured out our resources like water, and we find ourselves still engaged in the fearful struggle.

But the national cause is not the only one for which false anticipations were formed—for which the present condition of things presents a striking contrast with the early visions of its supporters. Those who heard, in Congress and elsewhere, the extravagances of the conspirators will know what were their hopes, what their expectations.

A speedy march upon the capital; a speedy overthrow of the legal Government; a speedy submission of a people too pusillanimous to maintain their rights; and a speedy subjection of the whole country to the assumptions of the South, were the prominent features of their delusion.

The conspirators taught their people to believe that if war came it would not be on their soil. As yet, the hostile foot has scarcely trod the soil of a free State, and it is upon the soil of the States in open rebellion that the contest has mainly been waged.

The Rebels found themselves, almost without resistance, in possession of every fort and harbor on the sea-coast of the revolted States, except Fort Pickens, Pensacola harbor, and the isolated fortifications and harbors of Tortugas and Key West.

They were, for the time being, masters of the territory of the revolted States, of the depots, arsenals and fortifications of the Government, and had high hopes that all the slaveholding Border States would soon be united with them. The fact that so many of these States hold to-day their true and loyal position in the Government demonstrates that true patriotism and loyalty is not confined to any section of the country, and gives full assurance that the Government will be maintained, its jurisdiction over every foot of our territory established, and our nationality vindicated.

The events of the past two years are too fresh in the memories of all to require recapitulation.

WHAT THE WAR HAS ACCOMPLISHED.

Your Committee will, however, briefly call attention to the fact that, from the commencement of active military and naval operations in the Winter and Spring of 1862, almost uninterrupted success for eight months attended all our operations, resulting in vast conquests. The triumphs of the navy at Hatteras, Port Royal and Fort Henry, were followed by the victories and conquests of the army at Mill Spring, Fort Donelson and Roanoke Island. Missouri was wrenched from the Rebel grasp, and the Rebel armies driven into Arkansas, where they were defeated in a pitched battle at Pea Ridge.

By the capture of Fort Donelson Kentucky was permanently redeemed, the capital of one of the largest revolted States seized, her great rivers laid open to our flotillas, and the war carried to the borders of the Gulf States. The Rebel stronghold on the Mississippi, Columbus, Island No. 10, Fort Pillow, together with Memphis, the most important commercial city of the State, fell into our hands.

The autumn of 1861 had witnessed the important capture of Hatteras and Port Royal by the navy. These successes were followed through the combined operations of the army and navy, in the Winter and Spring of 1862, by the capture of Roanoke Island and Newbern, Beaufort and Fort Macon, and by the reduction of the important fort, Pulaski, controlling the entrance to the Savannah river; of Fort Clinch, controlling the harbor and railroad depot of Fernandina; of Fort Marion, at St. Augustine. By the first-named operations we acquired control of the spacious inland waters of North Carolina (Albemarle and Pamlico sounds), and their adjacent shores, and of one of her two important seaports—Beaufort. By the last, we made ourselves masters of the rich sea islands and important harbors extending along the coast from Charleston to St. John's; leaving in the possession of the Rebels, on the Atlantic coast, but two harbors, Charleston and Wilmington.

But the brilliant triumphs of our army and navy elsewhere were surpassed by the capture of the great city of the Gulf, the depot of the great Valley of the Mississippi—New-Orleans; an achievement which, estimated by the importance of the conquest and the noble daring of its execution, is scarcely surpassed in history. By this important conquest we obtained control of a large portion of Louisiana, and accomplished the most important and difficult step toward obtaining the entire control of the Mississippi River, and caused the surrender of the harbor of Pensacola, with the forts yet held by the Rebels.

In these hastily sketched military and naval operations, extending in the West through the States of Arkansas, Missouri, Tennessee and Kentucky, and on the Atlantic seaboard from Hatteras to Florida, and on the Gulf from Pensacola to the mouths of the Mississippi, we really made conquests as vast as it often fails to the lot of the most powerful and warlike nations to make in so short a period of time. We pushed our conquests by land through Missouri, Kentucky and Tennessee to the very boundaries of the Gulf States; obtained control of the Mississippi River, except about 200 miles; occupied the coasts of North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia—a large portion of Louisiana; seized every important fort and harbor in the Rebel territory, save three (Wilmington, Charleston and Mobile,) reducing to a

corresponding extent the labors of the blockading squadron; captured fourteen permanent sea-coast forts, among which were the largest on the Southern coast, such as Pulaski, Barrancas, McRae, Jackson, and St. Philip. Following these conquests was the reduction of Yorktown and the evacuation of Norfolk, by which the waters of the James and York Rivers were laid open to our fleets, and the Rebels deprived of the facilities furnished by a great navy-yard, and compelled to destroy their only means of menacing our fleets in Hampton Roads—the Merrimac.

WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.

Had the success of the Army of the Potomac during this period corresponded with the success of our arms in other parts of the country, there is reason to believe that the termination of the campaign of 1862 would have seen the Rebellion well-nigh, if not entirely, overthrown.

Had Norfolk been captured during the Winter of 1861-62, and the Merrimac taken possession of or destroyed, the way to Richmond, by means of the James River, would have been open, and the fatal delays of the Peninsula avoided; or had the enemy, when at Manassas, some time during the Autumn of 1861 or Winter of 1861-62, have been compelled to come out from his intrenchments and give us battle, as he might have been, by threatening or actually interrupting his communication between Richmond and Manassas, on which he wholly depended for supplies—a line so long and difficult to maintain that we subsequently did not deem it practicable for us—we could have met him with an army greater than it was ever proposed to take against Richmond, and either have opened the way to the Rebel capital or made it unnecessary to go there.

In military movements delay is generally bad—decision is almost always fatal. In our movements we seem to have too often forgotten that momentum is made up of weight *and* velocity; that the force of the blow may depend as much upon the celerity of the movement as upon the weight of the body moved. The world's history shows that the successful General has met his enemy the day before he was expected—not the week or month after. Some of our points of attack have been so clearly indicated to the enemy beforehand, and our movements made with so much delay and hesitation, that he has been able not only to fortify his positions and concentrate his forces, but even to call into the field new armies to meet us. At such points we have failed.

It is particularly worthy of note that, in the reverses which followed the failure of the Peninsula campaign, at the time when the army of the Rebels had reached its greatest strength and its highest state of enthusiasm, they did not permanently regain any territory or recapture and hold any of the important or controlling points before held by us on Rebel soil. Their marches upon Washington, Maryland, and also Louisville, were little more than raids, from which they were obliged to retire before our opposing forces. This fact clearly shows that while it is impossible for us to constantly retain military possession of all the vast Rebel territory over which we may be called upon to pass in our operations against their armies, still the territory once held or occupied by us cannot be permanently regained by them—a sure indication of our ultimate success.

The past, notwithstanding its errors and reverses, is full of encouragement, and gives full assurance of final success. No great war was ever conducted by any people or Government without great mistakes—giving to the critics of the time and those of succeeding generations a wide and ample field for their labors. No people on earth were ever called suddenly into a great war more totally unprepared than were the loyal people of this Government. We felt so well assured of our position among the powers of the world that we had almost concluded we had fought our last battle, and our army and navy had come to be regarded by many as useless appendages to the Government. We had concluded that, doing justice to the nations of the world, we should receive justice in return; and the loyal portion of the

people were devoting all their energies and powers to the arts of peace, the advancement of civilization, the development of the rich and varied resources of our new and great country; and in these every man found full occupation for his talents and a wide field for his ambition—no man ever dreaming that the partricial arm would ever be raised against a Government so mild in its sway, so benignant in its influence over all its subjects.

It was indeed difficult for a people thus engrossed, suddenly and almost without warning, to turn its attention to war. The Rebels believed us to be so entirely devoted to the pursuits of peace that we should yield to their demands rather than be diverted from them; and hence their nefarious attempt to overthrow this fair Government, and erect on its ruins that horrid deformity, a free Government with human Slavery for its corner-stone. How terribly they have been mistaken, the past has already shown; and yet the energies and powers and resources of the loyal people have hardly begun to be applied to the suppression of the Rebellion. They must meet and contend in battle with that strength and power and intelligence which has built factories and workshops, railroads and steamboats, covered the ocean with ships, and filled the markets of the world with the product of its brain and hands; and they will find these no less powerful for destruction than for production, when once fully applied in that direction.

All the great industrial interests of the loyal States were never more active, more prosperous, than at this time. All that has been lost by the supply of men to the army has been made up by increased activity and energy, and the adaptation of machinery to work heretofore done by the human hand. There is only this marked difference: heretofore all these great forces have been applied for the benefit of the arts of peace; now they all look primarily to the prosecution of war; and years would have elapsed—far more than would be required to crush out the Rebellion—before we should develop our full strength for war.

Within less than two years we have thrown into and sustained in the field an army of a million of men. We have created a navy with which we have blockaded a coast greater in extent than was ever attempted by any Government before, and by our inventions and improvements so completely revolutionized naval warfare as to render the navies and sea-coast defenses of the world well nigh useless.

The efficiency of this blockade is attested not only by the destitution of the Rebels in every article of foreign production, but by the cry that comes to us every day from all parts of the world, in any degree dependent upon the products of the blockaded territory, stimulating us to still greater exertion to crush out this Rebellion, that the blockaded ports may be thrown open to the legitimate commerce of the world.

And while, in our efforts to maintain our Government and vindicate free institutions, we neither asked nor desired the aid of any foreign nation or Government, we did at least expect of the leading Powers of Europe that they should refrain from extending aid and encouragement to a Rebellion against a friendly Government, thereby prolonging a struggle which can only bring misery and suffering upon the whole civilized world, and may in the end lead to a war between our Government and some of those Powers, the full effects of which the future alone can disclose.

OUR RESOURCES.

We have carried on, shall carry on and conclude this war, without touching one dollar of the accumulated capital of the country. We are already astonished at the revenue now being raised from the taxation of our daily productions, and yet we do not begin to realize the amount to be yielded by the system already adopted, or the extent to which that system may be enlarged, without imposing any grievous burdens upon the people—any burden to which they will not cheerfully submit to accomplish the object intended.

No Government can long carry on a war which

must be sustained by the accumulated capital of the country, and there is scarcely a limit to the time war may be prosecuted by a Government whose credit is sustained by the revenues derived from the accumulating wealth of the country.

REBEL DEFICIENCIES.

Every dollar the Rebels have expended or can expend in this Rebellion has been and must continue to be drawn from their accumulated capital. Their intercourse with foreign nations has been almost wholly suspended, all their industrial interests have been paralyzed, and there is no source from which they can derive revenue or means for the maintenance of the war, except by depriving the people of their property, day after day, and year after year, so long as the war shall continue, thus reducing them to poverty and want. This is a truth which the people in the revolted States are already beginning to realize. They had been made to believe that an export duty on cotton, which the world would be obliged to pay, would yield them the richest revenue ever realized by any Government, and that if the Federal Government should attempt interference with its exportation, they could command the armies and navies of Europe to fight their battles for them. How bitter must be their disappointment as they apply with their own hands the torch which consigns it to ashes, and then are compelled to supply to their leaders, from their other property, the means to sustain the Rebellion! Their currency has almost ceased to be regarded, even by themselves, as the representative of value.

Conscription has exhausted their people, and the wealth which long years of uninterrupted prosperity under the best government the world ever saw, had placed in their hands, has already been expended, and they are now struggling on with the vain hope that dissensions among ourselves, or foreign intervention, may save them from that ruin which they see clearly impending over them. Every day must show them more and more clearly that on neither of these sources can they rely for help. The utter scorn and contempt with which every man in the loyal States who proposes any adjustment of this contest except the absolute, unqualified, and unconditional subjugation of every Rebel in the land to the Constitution and the laws, is held by every officer and soldier in our army, and every loyal man in the country, must banish from their minds the last ray of hope from that source. The reaction which followed the recent slight manifestations of a willingness on the part of a few Secession sympathizers to offer terms of compromise must convince them that they have no allies in the loyal States on whom they can rely; and the present condition of affairs in Europe must forever crush that false and delusive hope which they have heretofore entertained, that the intervention of European powers might enable them to accomplish what they know full well they can never attain unaided.

THE TASK BEFORE US.

We now see clearly what we have to do. We must obtain uninterrupted control of the Mississippi. We must reach those great railroad arteries—the one bordering the Atlantic seaboard, the other stretching through the Virginia and Tennessee valleys to the west and south. We must, as soon as possible, take the few fortified seaports remaining in possession of the Rebels, cut it off from all external sources of food and arms, and have surrounded it by forces which can press upon it from any quarter, at the same time severing into isolated portions the Rebel territory and destroying their means of intercommunication, by which alone they have hitherto been enabled to meet us in force wherever we have presented ourselves, and by which alone they have been able to feed and supply their armies.

By possessing ourselves of, and keeping open, the great natural highways alone (and a possession of a navy by us should have early suggested this), we sever parts of their territory mutually dependent, and, while crippling them, enable ourselves to speedily concentrate our forces at any point where it may be advisable to strike.

These decisive measures we are actually executing or preparing to execute. The successes and conquests we have already described have carried us through the preliminary stages, and the blows we now strike—each one of them that succeeds—will reach the very vitals of the Rebellion. Let any one cast his eye upon the map, and these truths will be apparent.

It may be in the future, as in the past, we shall meet with reverses: they are the inevitable incidents of a great war extending over so vast a territory, and requiring great armies at so widely separated points. We have already seen that it is not our true policy to attempt an actual military occupation of the Rebel territory, except at a few and important controlling points. We must destroy their armies, and to do this we must concentrate, not scatter, our forces. It is better to operate successfully against one stronghold or one army than to attempt three and fail. The indications now clearly are that, both in the East and West, the campaign of 1863 will give us brilliant achievements—decisive victories. Our Generals now in the field have the full confidence of the soldiers and the people, and the armies will go forth, knowing that their ranks are to be made full; that every day that passes will add to, not diminish, their strength or numbers. Never before did the world see such an army in the field; never before did Generals lead such men to battle. Each man goes forth feeling, not only that he has a soldier's reputation to maintain, but also that he has a country to defend in which his interest is as great as that of the highest officer in the land. Such an army, with its energy, power, intelligence and will, properly directed, must be invincible. The past has already demonstrated that the true American soldier can be relied upon, to dare, do, and endure all that human power can attempt, accomplish, or sustain.

Let no man be placed or kept in command of such men who have not the ability to command and the will to do; thus the errors and mistakes of the past will be avoided in the future, the fond hopes and anticipations of a true and loyal people realized, the Government vindicated and rebellion speedily and forever crushed.

We know that this contest has cost us and will cost us treasures and blood—the best blood ever shed by any people in maintenance of their Government and in defense of free institutions—the blood of the flower of our land. Let us not make their lives a vain offering, by for a moment entertaining the idea of a partition of our territory, which would forever involve us in anarchy and border wars, or by any base compromise with Rebels.

We owe it to the noble dead who have shed their blood in founding and defending this Government; we owe it to ourselves; we owe it to the countless millions who are to come after us, to maintain this Government and the institutions we have inherited from our fathers—the richest legacy ever bequeathed by one generation to another—and to transmit them to our posterity, if not improved, certainly unimpaired.

In conclusion, your Committee will only say, that all the men who hold high positions in the army and navy, and have rendered valuable services to the country, with whom they have held intercourse, unite in the opinion that fighting, and *only* fighting, can end this Rebellion; that every traitor in the land must and shall be made to acknowledge and yield absolute, unqualified and unconditional obedience to the Constitution and laws.

And your Committee believe this to be the sentiment, not only of the army and navy, but of every man in the country—traitors and cowards alone excepted.

B. F. WADE,
Z. C. CHANDLER,
On the part of the Senate.

D. W. GOOCH,
JOHN COVODE,
G. W. JULIAN,
M. F. ODELL,
On the part of the House.

LORD LYONS TO EARL RUSSELL.

The British Envoy at Washington has hitherto had credit for a forbearance and impartiality with regard to our internal quarrel whereof Earl Russell has seen fit suddenly to disrobe him. The following dispatch, written by Lord Lyons to the Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 17th of last November, gives an edifying account of a visit by Lord L. to this city on the 8th, and of certain remarkable conferences had by him here with certain persons whom he characterizes as "the conservative leaders."

WASHINGTON, Nov. 17, 1862.

MY LORD: In his dispatches of the 17th and 24th ultimo, and of the 7th instant, Mr. Stuart reported to your Lordship the results of the elections for members of Congress and State officers which have recently taken place in several of the most important States of the Union. Without repeating the details, it will be sufficient for me to observe that the success of the Democratic or (as it now styles itself) the Conservative party, has been so great as to manifest a change in public feeling among the most rapid and the most complete that has ever been witnessed, even in this country.

On my arrival at New-York on the 8th instant I found the Conservative leaders exulting in the crowning success achieved by the party in that State. They appeared to rejoice, above all, in the conviction that personal liberty and freedom of speech had been secured for the principal State of the Union. They believed that the Government must at once desist from exercising in the State of New-York the extraordinary (and as they regarded them) illegal and unconstitutional powers which it had assumed. They were confident that at all events after the 1st of January next, on which day the newly-elected Governor would come into office, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus could not be practically maintained. They seemed to be persuaded that the result of the elections would be accepted by the President as a declaration of the will of the people; that he would increase the moderate and conservative element in the Cabinet; that he would seek to terminate the war, not to push it to extremity; that he would endeavor to effect a reconciliation with the people of the South, and renounce the idea of subjugating or exterminating them.

On the following morning, however, intelligence arrived from Washington which dashed the rising hopes of the Conservatives. It was announced that Gen. McClellan had been dismissed from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and ordered to repair to his home; that he had, in fact been removed altogether from active service. The General had been regarded as the representative of Conservative principles in the army. Support of him had been made one of the articles of the Conservative electoral programme. His dismissal was taken as a sign that the President had thrown himself entirely into the arms of the extreme Radical party, and that the attempt to carry out the policy of that party would be persisted in. The irritation of the Conservatives at New-York was certainly very great; it seemed, however, to be not unmingled with consternation and despondency.

Several of the leaders of the Democratic party sought interviews with me, both before and after the arrival of the intelligence of Gen. McClellan's dismissal. The subject uppermost in their minds while they were speaking to me was naturally that of foreign mediation between the North and South. Many of them seemed to think that this mediation must come at last; but they appeared to be very

much afraid of its coming too soon. It was evident that they apprehended that a premature proposal of foreign intervention would afford the Radical party a means of reviving the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating the peaceful plans of the Conservatives. They appeared to regard the present moment as peculiarly unfavorable for such an offer, and, indeed, to hold that it would be essential to the success of any proposal from abroad that it should be deferred until the control of the Executive Government should be in the hands of the Conservative party.

I gave no opinion on the subject. I did not say whether or not I myself thought foreign intervention probable or advisable; but I listened with attention to the accounts given me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative party. At the bottom I thought I perceived a desire to put an end to the war, even at the risk of losing the Southern States altogether; but it was plain that it was not thought prudent to avow this desire. Indeed, some hints of it, dropped before the elections, were so ill received that a strong declaration in the contrary sense was deemed necessary by the Democratic leaders.

At the present moment, therefore, the chiefs of the Conservative party call loudly for a more vigorous prosecution of the war, and reproach the Government with slackness as well as with want of success in its military measures. But they repudiate all idea of interfering with the institutions of the Southern people, or of waging a war of subjugation or extermination. They maintain that the object of the military operations should be to place the North in a position to demand an armistice with honor and with effect. The armistice should (they hold) be followed by a Convention, in which such changes of the Constitution should be proposed as would give the South ample security on the subject of its slave property, and would enable the North and the South to reunite and to live together in peace and harmony. The Conservatives profess to think that the South might be induced to take part in such a Convention, and that a restoration of the Union would be the result. The more sagacious members of the party must, however, look upon the proposal of a Convention merely as a last experiment to test the possibility of reunion. They are no doubt well aware that the more probable consequence of an armistice would be the establishment of Southern independence; but they perceive that if the South is so utterly alienated, that no possible concessions will induce it to return voluntarily to the Union, it is wiser to agree to separation than to prosecute a cruel and hopeless war.

It is with reference to such an armistice as they desire to attain that the leaders of the Conservative party regard the question of foreign mediation. They think that the offer of mediation, if made, to a Radical Administration, would be rejected; that if made at an unpropitious moment it might increase the virulence with which the war is prosecuted. If their own party were in power, or virtually con-

trolled the Administration, they would rather, if possible, obtain an armistice without the aid of foreign Governments; but they would be disposed to accept an offer of mediation if it appeared to be the only means of putting a stop to hostilities. They would desire that the offer should come from the great Powers of Europe conjointly, and in particular that as little prominence as possible should be given to Great Britain.

At Washington I have had fewer opportunities than I had at New-York of ascertaining the present views of the chiefs of the political parties. At the interview which I had with Mr. Seward, one day after my arrival, he showed no disposition to enter upon political matters. He did not appear to expect or to desire to receive from me any special communication from Her Majesty's Government. The President, when I waited upon him, talked to me only on ordinary topics. I, for my part, gladly shunned all allusion to foreign intervention, my principal object being to avoid saying any thing which might embarrass me in carrying out any instructions on the subject which I may receive from your Lordship.

All things considered, my own opinion certainly is that the present moment is not a favorable one for making an offer of mediation. It might embarrass the peace party, and even oblige them, in order to maintain their popularity, to make some public declarations against it, and this might make it difficult for them to accept a similar offer at a more propitious time. It would in all probability be rejected by the President, who appears to have thrown himself into the arms of the extreme radical party. The views of that party are clear and definite. They declare that there is no hope of reconciliation with the Southern people; that the war must be pursued, *per fas aut nefas*, until the disloyal men of the South are ruined and subjugated, if not exterminated; that not an inch of the old territory of the Republic must be given up; that foreign intervention, in any shape, must be rejected and resisted. This party would desire to turn an offer of mediation to account, for the purpose of inflaming the war spirit and producing a reaction against the Conservatives.

It is probable, too, that the Government would urge, in answer to an offer of mediation, that it has by no means abandoned the hope of putting down the Rebellion within a reasonable time; that, at all events, this is not a moment at which it can reasonably be called upon to put a stop to hostilities. It would observe that the armies of the United States are everywhere advancing, and that expeditions are prepared against Texas, as well as against Charleston, Mobile, and other points on the coast. It would point out that it had equipped a considerable number of war vessels, iron-clad as well as others, at a vast expense; that the season had just arrived when the Autumn rains would render the rivers navigable by armed vessels, and when the Southern coast would be free from epidemic disease. It might even represent an advance of the Army of the Potomac to Richmond as a probable event. The experience of the past is certainly not calculated to inspire any great confidence in the results of these warlike preparations; but in the political interests of the party now in power render a continuance of the war a necessity to it. Its only chance of regaining its lost popularity lies in successful military operations. Unless it can obtain a much higher place in public estimation than it now occupies, not only will its tenure of power become extremely precarious, but some of its leading members may be called to a

severe account for their extra legal proceedings. During the session of Congress which begins next month, the present Administration has indeed reason to expect an uncompromising support from a majority of both Houses of Congress. But on the 4th of March next the existing House of Representatives is dissolved by the terms of the Constitution, and at the same time several of the present Senators go out of office. The majority of the members chosen at the recent elections for the new House of Representatives are of the Democratic or Conservative party, and in some States Senators of that party will be returned in the room of those whose terms of office expire next March. The new Congress is in fact likely to be hostile to the Administration and to the radical party; and, although it will not, in the ordinary course of things, assemble until the last month of next year, the President will hardly be able to persist in his present policy and in his assumption of extraordinary powers, unless he can, in virtue of military successes, obtain a reputation with the people which will sustain him in a contest with the Legislature.

It would seem, then, to be vain to make an offer of mediation to the present Government, in their present mood, with any notion that it would be accepted. A change of mood may, however, take place after the 4th of March, if no great military successes occur in the interval. Such a change may possibly be produced sooner by military reverses. A proposal, however, to mediate, made even under present circumstances, by three or more of the Great Powers of Europe conjointly, might not produce any great inconvenience.

It is, indeed, urged by some people that mediation should be offered, not so much with a view to its being accepted, as to its clearing the way for a recognition of the Southern Confederacy. And, indeed, if it were determined that the time had come for recognizing that Confederacy, no doubt an offer of mediation would be a suitable preliminary. But I do not clearly understand what a advantage is expected to result from a simple recognition of the Southern Government; and I presume that the European Powers do not contemplate breaking up the blockade by force of arms, or engaging in hostilities with the United States in support of the independence of the South.

I have, indeed, heard it maintained that Great Britain should recognize the independence of the South as soon as possible, with a view to impede the success of the efforts of the Conservative party to reconstruct the Union. The advocates of this opinion consider a reunion a probable event, and apprehend that the first result of it would be that the combined forces of the North and South would be let loose upon Canada. I certainly do not at present share these apprehensions. All hope of the reconstruction of the Union appears to be fading away, even from the minds of those who most ardently desire it. But if the reconstruction be still possible, I do not think that we need conclude that it would lead to an invasion of Canada, or to any consequences injurious to Great Britain. At any rate, dangers of this kind are remote. The immediate and obvious interest of Great Britain, as well as the rest of Europe, is that peace and prosperity should be restored to this country as soon as possible. The point chiefly worthy of consideration appears to be whether separation or reunion be the more likely to effect this object.

I have, &c,

LYONS.

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